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<p>The Journal provides a free forum for academic discussion. Opinions presented in this Journal are not of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, the Journal or its editors. Opinions published in this Journal are those of their authors.</p>

From the Editor

The response we received from readers of the first issue of the *Jordan Journal of International Affairs (JJIA)* was beyond our expectations. Many readers who reviewed the first issue of our Journal sent us invaluable suggestions, which we have taken into serious consideration.

This second issue of *JJIA* comes at a time when our region is facing challenges to its stability and to the well-being of its peoples, who aspire to a dignified life; hence the studies and articles tackling difficult issues of interest to both officials and other readers. This issue also contains an article that was translated from English into Arabic, and a study that was translated from Arabic into English, thus ensuring that important and informative contributions are available in both languages. A new item in the Arabic section, entitled “I was an Ambassador,” was introduced, which highlights the experiences of well-known politicians and diplomats. Prominent Jordanian politician, Taher Masri, begins this series of articles by writing about his experiences as an ambassador in several European capitals.

This issue includes articles in Arabic by experts and specialists on issues of concern to the peoples of the region. They include a study about the conflict in Darfur, and an article about state-building in Palestine under Yasser Arafat. The American role in the Balfour Declaration, translated from the English section, is discussed; a paper about the “dilemma of security” in the Arabian Gulf argues that a “fourth” war is likely in this oil rich region. Further articles tackle important topics such as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the role of the US Congress in formulating American foreign policy.

The English section of the Journal deals with no less important issues; there is a study on Jordanian Diplomacy under the leadership of King Abdullah II, which addresses how Jordan’s significance derives from the difficulties in its “neighborhood”. It also discusses how and why Jordanian diplomacy enjoys world respect and appreciation. As mentioned prior, there are articles on the American role in the Balfour Declaration’s issuance and Darfur, followed by a comparison between Christian Evangelicalism and Islam and their approach to democracy. Finally, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, is reviewed.

As we are still in the early stages of our “endeavor”, we are in need of scholarly contributions from writers of all schools of thought. We greatly appreciate all the comments we have received and extend our thanks, in advance, for your further interest and contributions.

Tawfiq Hasou

The Diplomacy of Small States: The Case of Jordan

Alan Henrikson*

The international significance of some small countries, including the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is much greater than their size might suggest. They can be on the front lines of global environmental issues, at strategic centers of geopolitical conflict, and also even on a higher moral plane. Jordan itself has the further roles of regional commercial entrepôt, coordinator of the new lower middle-income countries group (G11), and envisions of a broader international sphere of concern about the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Perhaps no other small country is more governed by the importance that other, stronger countries place upon it. The very pressures of external circumstance and of Jordan's complex internal composition and situation as well have forced –but also enabled– its monarch, King Abdullah II, and its diplomats to take advantage of others' interest in the country and its stability. They have done so with considerable skill and success so far–without, however, the degree of democratic involvement that may be needed to develop a stronger national Jordanian diplomatic tradition.

The subject of the diplomacy of small states is “larger” than it has ever been.⁽¹⁾ There are simply more national players in the international game than there have been, and most of these –relative to the Great Powers that traditionally have dominated the game of Diplomacy– are small ones. This is not to say that the United States and other major powers do not still set the agenda and even control international relations. It is to say, however, that the context –the frame of reference– of international diplomacy has changed, from the days of Leopold von Ranke's *Die Grossen Mächte* or even Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy*.⁽²⁾

Numbers in the international system count. Especially in formal organizational

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1. Alan K. Henrikson, “A Coming ‘Magnesian’ Age? Small States, the Global System, and the International Community,” *Geopolitics* 6, no. 3 (Winter 2001), pp. 49-86; Alan K. Henrikson, “Diplomacy and Small States in Today's World,” in *In Face of Man, Vol. 2: The Dr. Eric Williams Memorial Lectures 1993-2004* (Port-of-Spain: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, 2005), pp. 19-40, online at <http://www.diplomacy.edu/Conferences/SmallStates/discussion.asp> (accessed January 7, 2008).
2. Leopold von Ranke, “The Great Powers (*Die Grossen Mächte*)[1833],” in Theodore H. Von Laue, *Leopold von Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 181-218; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

settings such as the United Nations (UN), where the principle of the sovereign equality of states, large and small, is enshrined, smaller countries, Jordan included, can have significant influence. This is especially the case if small states having common interests concert their efforts. A recent example is the initiative of five smaller countries, the “Small Five” (S5) of Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland, to reform the “working methods” of the Security Council, even if the debate on enlargement of the Council remains stalled. Although the US representative to the UN at the time the S5 representatives initially advanced their proposal, John Bolton, said that he wouldn’t even “look at” their paper, the S5 recommendations received a welcome hearing in the General Assembly and, indirectly as well as directly, have put pressure on Security Council members to further open up, and become consultative.⁽³⁾ As a result, the “deliberative deficit” at the United Nations has been somewhat overcome, even if the “democratic deficit” may remain.⁽⁴⁾ Jordan’s sharing in the leadership of this diplomatic effort at the UN will, in time, contribute to making the entire multilateral system work better, or at least more openly and inclusively.

What, however, are the actual substantive contributions that small states recently have made, and can make, through the exercise of diplomacy? What, in particular, is the country of Jordan doing to achieve results and thereby gain recognition, for itself and for others similar to it, on the international scene? Is Jordan a special “case,” or is its diplomatic role like that of most other comparably sized nations? I would suggest that Jordan’s case is quite specific and indeed exceptional.

Jordan’s position in the Middle East is often described as “pivotal.”⁽⁵⁾ To a remarkable degree, other countries, far beyond the region as well as within it, attach importance to Jordan’s location and role at the center of things in the Middle East. The high value that others place on the Hashemite Kingdom surely owes a great deal to Jordan’s own efforts—above all, its diplomacy.

To a much greater extent than for most countries, even other small monarchies, Jordan’s diplomacy is identified with the person and the personality of its leadership—most notably, King Hussein and, after his passing on February 7, 1999, King Abdullah II. The basis of this reality is historical and constitutional. Jordan is “a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary system.”⁽⁶⁾ According to Article 26 of the 1952 Con-

3. Maggie Farley, “Small Nations Propose Reforms for UN,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 10, 2005. See also “Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to Reform Security Council Working Methods 1993-2007,” Special Research Report, *Security Council Report*, No. 3, 2007 (October 18, 2007).

4. Ian Johnstone, “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument,” *European Journal of International Law* 14, no. 3 (2003), pp. 437-480.

5. Asher Susser, *Jordan: Case Study of a Pivotal State* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). Alan George, in *Jordan: Living in the Crossfire* (London: Zed Books, 2005), describes Jordan as forming “the pivot between Israel and Palestine to the west, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to the south and Syria to the north”, p. 150.

6. “The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” online at <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution.html> (accessed on February 22, 2008).

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stitution, “The Executive Power shall be vested in the King, who shall exercise his powers through his Ministers.” The king is “the Supreme Commander of the Land, Naval and Air Forces” (Article 32). He “declares war, concludes peace and ratifies treaties and agreements” (Article 33(i)). He convenes the National Assembly, a bicameral body, and prorogues it. He may dissolve the Senate, whose members he appoints, and also the Chamber of Deputies (Article 34), whose members are elected according to a restrictive procedure favoring the rural population, including relatively conservative tribal groups loyal to the king, over the more progressive urban population.⁽⁷⁾ The king appoints the prime minister and other ministers, and can dismiss them at will (Article 35).

Not surprisingly, with these formal powers and their own personal energy, Jordan’s sovereigns have been not just figureheads but also active political figures, engaged in a leading way in nearly every aspect of the country’s affairs, including its neighborly and wider international relations. Their royal spouses, too, have been involved and very active socially in the region and abroad.⁽⁸⁾

Far from being a “one person” show –that of the king or, in certain spheres of activity, the queen– Jordanian diplomacy does have an institutional base. It continues to rest mainly on the authority of the palace rather than on authorization by parliament, although some legislators and their committees have a strong and responsible interest in the country’s foreign affairs. Political parties as such, it has been observed, have relatively little influence in Jordan. The only coherent opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, did especially badly in the most recent parliamentary election, winning only six seats of the 22 it had aimed for. This result, reflecting the IAF’s own factionalism as well as a disadvantageous electoral system (which the king himself wishes to see made somewhat more representative), is further evidence of the difficulty of generating a truly functional Jordanian democracy. “With the Islamist lobby in parliament much weakened,” observes The Economist Intelligence Unit, “the prospects for political reform have deteriorated.”⁽⁹⁾ Many of Jordan’s periodic political openings have been palace-initiated exercises in what has been called “defensive democratization,” rather than expressions

7. *Assessment of the Electoral Framework Final Report: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, Democracy Reporting International and Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (Berlin: Democracy Reporting International, January 2007), which includes an analysis of the effects of the temporary election law (TEL) introduced for the elections of 2003, and other factors that inhibit full democratic expression in Jordan today.

8. Queen Noor, for instance, in 1998 became the international spokesperson for the Landmine Survivors Network. Currently, Queen Rania serves as UNICEF’s first Eminent Advocate for Children. On this and her other international roles, see Barbara Crossette, “Giving Globally,” *The InterDependent* 5, no. 3 (Fall 2007), pp. 9-10.

9. “Islamists’ electoral disaster,” Economist Intelligence Unit Briefing, November 22, 2007, online at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=10178007 (accessed on February 22, 2008).

of parliamentary or popular will.⁽¹⁰⁾ At the same time, if mainly through consultation and control than through active use of the mechanisms of constitutional democracy, stability has been preserved.⁽¹¹⁾

In these circumstances, with ultimate power residing with the king, the royal court, the army, and also the security services, the role of Jordan's diplomats stands out. Diplomats are, of course, appointed rather than elected. Yet they are professional rather than political. Jordan has a talented, well-trained, and effective group of diplomatic practitioners. They would readily meet most standard tests of merit, and may fairly be considered a meritocratic elite. The diplomats' relationship to the king, *however*, still remains of paramount importance. They are, and often personally see themselves as; *his* representatives. "Unlike nearly every other ambassador in Washington—who thinks he or she has the most difficult job on Earth—Jordan's Karim Kawar isn't complaining," observed *The Washington Diplomat*. "My job is one of the easiest in Washington, because I represent His Majesty," he said." Owing in some part to this image-fusion, so to speak, of royal and ambassadorial roles, and perhaps the resulting increase of credibility, Ambassador Kawar was able to say, for Jordan: "We have all open doors and unlimited access to the Bush administration. Congress has been very supportive as well, in both chambers and across the aisle. We have excellent relationships with both parties, the institutions and the think tanks."⁽¹²⁾ Such relationships are not formed automatically, in response to dramatic events or coincident interests. They require active diplomatic mediation. Small-state ambassadors can provide it.

Having previously considered this subject of "the diplomacy of small states" with regard to, particularly, Trinidad and Tobago and other Caribbean island states, Armenia in the Caucasus region, and Malta in the Mediterranean, and therefore implicitly with interregional comparison and generalization in mind, I would identify, at the outset, three major contributions smaller countries have made in their diplomacies. I shall endeavor to relate these to the substance as well as the style of Jordan's diplomacy, as a "case study".

First, many small states are *on the front lines of global issues*, including global warming and sea level rise, and through the diplomacy they conduct can alert the international community to the immediacy and the urgency of these problems. Second, many small states are *strategically and dangerously located* in highly unsettled geopolitical zones. Lest they be mere buffers for others' conflicts, they may need to use their diplomatic skills to mediate and otherwise attempt to manage the hostile forces around them. Third, because of their cultural traditions as well as their histori-

10. Glen E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 30, no. 3 (August 1998), pp. 387-410.

11. Julia Choucair, *Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability*, Middle East Series, No. 76, Democracy and Rule of Law Project (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2006).

12. Larry Luxner, "Ambassador of Jordan Vows to Stay Course Despite Bombings," *The Washington Diplomat*, January 2006.

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cal experiences, certain small states can be in a position to exert *moral leadership*, of importance to themselves and also of relevance to the wider world.

“All the world owes much to the little ‘five feet high’ nations,” said President John F. Kennedy, quoting “one of the great orators of the English language” [David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain and a Welshman]. “The greatest art of the world was the work of little nations. The most enduring literature of the world came from little nations. The heroic deeds that thrill humanity through generations were the deeds of little nations fighting for their freedoms. And oh, yes, the salvation of mankind came through a little nation.”⁽¹³⁾

ENVIRONMENTAL, GEOPOLITICAL, AND MORAL DIPLOMACY—AND JORDAN

Some of the “little nations,” given their small physical size and high degree of exposure to changing environmental conditions, both natural and man-made, are the most vulnerable to the environmental challenges of our time. As a result, they may also have the most to say to the rest of the international community about the immediacy and urgency of the challenge of global warming as well as other, more local factors that contribute to the planet’s resource depletion and environmental degradation. Their very existence, in some cases, may be at stake, territorially as well as economically. Small states have therefore become, as was pointed out in 1999 by Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, a “front-line zone where, in concentrated form, many of the main problems of environment and development are unfolding.”⁽¹⁴⁾ Within the United Nations system and beyond, the group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) has been working to draw the world’s attention to their plight. A formally organized Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has even been described as “The International Conscience” on the subject.⁽¹⁵⁾

Jordan, though an inland rather than an island country, also is challenged by the changing global climate, because of shifting patterns of rainfall. “Water is life” for Jordan, affirms The Health and Environment Linkages Initiative (HELI). “Jordan has one of the lowest levels of water resource availability, per capita, in the world,” it reports. “Water scarcity will become an even greater problem over the next two decades as the population doubles and climate change potentially makes precipitation more uncertain and variable, particularly in this region. Management of water resources

13. John F. Kennedy, address before the Irish Parliament in Dublin, June 28, 1963, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1963* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 534-539.

14. *Statement of the Secretary-General*, General Assembly Plenary – 1b – Press Release GA/9610, Twenty-Second Special Session ENV/DEV/519, 1st Meeting (AM), September 27, 1999.

15. W. Jackson Davis, “The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): The International Conscience,” *Asia-Pacific Magazine* 2 (May 1996), pp. 17-22.

is therefore a key issue facing national governmental authorities.”⁽¹⁶⁾ Jordan’s is an external diplomatic problem as well as an internal administrative problem. It therefore has actively sought, at the regional level and beyond, to enhance the amount and quality of its water supplies. Conservation has become a major theme of Jordanian diplomacy. In 1980 it was one of the original 30 countries –and the only Arab country– to support the World Conservation Strategy (WCS).

Good relations with Israel obviously are necessary for this vital purpose as well as for other practical reasons. This was explicitly recognized in the historic “Washington Declaration” of Israel, Jordan, and the United States of July 25, 1994, which provided for, inter alia, negotiations leading to rightful allocations of the waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. The scientific and technical aspects of this subject are being dealt with as well in a broader international context, with Jordan planning to host a regional workshop cosponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with involvement by other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. If it can succeed in heading off an imminent “water catastrophe,” with the country “consuming more water than it has available from secure (annually renewable) sources,” the government will set a positive example for the entire Middle East as well as for other arid regions of the world.⁽¹⁷⁾ It can even use archeology for this purpose. Jordan’s all-out diplomatic and public-relations effort to have the 3,000-year-old Nabatean city of Petra, with the remnants of its ingenious ancient water system preserved, declared one of the new “Wonders of the World” may further bring attention to Jordan’s potentially desperate water shortage.⁽¹⁸⁾

The hydro-politics of Jordan’s survival are inseparable from the broader geopolitics of its location. It is situated at one of the truly strategic crossroads of the world. It lies in the midst of the historical Holy Land, with its legendary routes, fabled battles and other events. In recent decades, its security has been affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the west and three Gulf area wars, all of them involving next-door neighbor Iraq, to the east. As a small country, with precious little oil and gas of its own, and with a small though efficient military, Jordan simply cannot sustain or defend itself by its own means. It must rely therefore on outside support and protection. The *only* way it can secure such help is through diplomacy—through active liaison

16. “Jordan: Water is Life,” The Health and Environment Linkages Initiative (HELI) [World Health Organization and UNEP], online at <http://www.who.int/heli/pilots/jordan/en/index.html> (accessed December 28, 2007).

17. “Environment and Water,” Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan website (accessed on December 28, 2007).

18. Larry Luxner, “Jordan’s Petra Vies to Become New ‘Wonder of the World,’” *The Washington Diplomat*, July 2007.

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and good relations with friends and allies, initially the United Kingdom and, more recently, the United States of America.⁽¹⁹⁾ This it has succeeded in doing, at considerable risk of distancing itself politically from its own Arab neighborhood, from which it also has received substantial support though irregularly, especially from Saudi Arabia and from Iraq.⁽²⁰⁾

Within its immediate region, Jordan has consistently been a proponent of peace, and its diplomacy has reflected this primary preoccupation. The deepest and most critical challenge for the country, for it involves its very identity, has been the problem of Palestine—the West Bank, over which Jordan lost control to the Israeli army during the 1967 War. The late King Hussein, while upholding the responsibilities of the Hashemite Royal Family toward the Arab nation, came to accept the necessity of recognizing the State of Israel and also of establishing a separate Palestinian state, under the authority of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).⁽²¹⁾ He was personally involved, at the United Nations in New York, in the drafting of the Security Council's Resolution 242, with its basic land-for-peace formula and emphasis on the need for "secure and recognized borders." He continued to advocate for "a just and lasting peace" in the Middle East, even though criticized in Washington and elsewhere for insisting upon strict and full implementation of Resolution 242 and its successor, Resolution 338, the cease-fire at the end of the 1973 October War.

Following the second Gulf War and the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which altered Middle Eastern political balances, and, particularly, in consequence of the confidential Oslo process and separate PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty between themselves. This was done in the presence of US President Bill Clinton in Wadi Araba on October 26, 1994. "King Hussein, today in this arid place," President Clinton said, "you bring to full flower the memory of the man who taught you to seek peace, your grandfather, King Abdullah."⁽²²⁾ While these developments relieved Jordan of the direct burden of the West Bank, and excluded the "Jordanian option" for the relocation for Palestine, they did not solve the political problem of Palestinian statehood or the human problem of Palestinian refugees. Jordan's refugee problems were greatly compounded later by the flood of Iraqi refugees who sought safety in Jordan following the outbreak of the third Gulf War, in March 2003.

19. In 1996 the United States government designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally. The British background is treated in detail in Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

20. David Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003).

21. Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).

22. William J. Clinton, remarks at the signing ceremony for the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty at the border between Israel and Jordan, October 26, 1994, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1994, Book II – August 1 to December 31, 1994* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 1877-1879.

The urgency of the geopolitical situation for Jordan, inside and outside, has caused the country's leadership to try to bring the relevant parties together. With a major focus on the Palestine question, the "core cause" of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict, King Abdullah II achieved a meeting at Aqaba on June 4, 2003, of the Israeli and Palestinian premiers, Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas [Abu Mazen], together with the new President of the United States, George W. Bush. The American leader had the previous year, in a significant step, committed the United States to the concept of an independent Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, in peace. This became the basis of the so-called Roadmap for Peace advanced by the "Quartet" of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations. As President Bush, who had envisioned the end-of-2005 as the goal for formal establishment of a Palestinian state, recalled of that meeting: "When I laid out the date of 2005, I believe it was around the time I went to Aqaba, Jordan. It was a very meaningful moment, where former Prime Minister Abu Mazen, myself, Prime Minister Sharon and His Majesty, the King of Jordan, stood up and pledged to work together."⁽²³⁾

Subsequent events, including Israel's construction of a "security" wall on occupied Palestinian land and as well as political turbulence and violence in the Palestinian-controlled territories, have impeded the implementation of the Roadmap. Jordan continues, however, to support President Bush's June 2002 fundamental "vision of two states, a secure State of Israel and a viable, peaceful, democratic Palestine" as the necessary "framework for progress towards lasting peace and security in the Middle East."⁽²⁴⁾ Jordan recognizes also the need for progress along the Syrian-Israeli track and the Lebanese-Israeli track, as well as the central Palestinian-Israeli track. It continues to advocate, and when possible to assist on the ground, all *realistic* efforts for peace, as a national political imperative and also for larger moral reasons—for the life of the peoples of the region.

In accordance with a proposal advanced by then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2002, the Arab states have offered to recognize Israel in return for establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of pre-1967 borders, and a "just" and "agreed-upon" solution of the Palestinian refugee problem.⁽²⁵⁾ Jordan supports this effort. It is one of "a core group of Arab states that is committed to fostering an environment of confidence between the parties," emphasizes the Jordanian king, Abdullah II. "The implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative would create two states –Israel and an independent Palestinian state– living alongside each other in peace and security." His

23. George W. Bush, interviewed by Egypt's *Al-Ahram* newspaper, May 8, 2004. For President Bush's remarks at the Red Sea Summit in Aqaba, Jordan, June 4, 2003, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush, 2003, Book I (January 1 to June 30, 2003)* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), pp. 590-594.

24. "Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East: Israel/Palestinian Reciprocal Action, Quartet Support," Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 16, 2003.

25. Steven Erlanger, "Jordan's King in West Bank to Discuss Peace Efforts," *The New York Times*, May 12, 2007.

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and other Jordanians' increasing concern is the viability of a Palestinian state. "We need to fully support President Abbas in areas such as institution-building, especially strengthening capacity in the area of security, and in stimulating the Palestinian economy, which has been terribly damaged by Israeli restrictions on the free movement of goods and people and international sanctions."⁽²⁶⁾

Rather than merely buffering the clash between Israelis and Palestinians, and also divisions within the Arab world itself, Jordan has attempted to moderate the conflicts around it by trying to transpose certain of the issues involved onto a higher plane. A permeable society as well as a precariously located one in geographical terms, with few natural defenses, Jordan, as noted, cannot achieve security merely through border patrolling, internal policing or by conventional diplomacy. It must appeal to the minds, hearts, and souls of the peoples involved—to try to foster agreement on a spiritual level.

While not itself a religious center, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan does retain an inherited responsibility for custodianship of the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.⁽²⁷⁾ This gives it a certain standing in the sphere of religion - the moral sphere. Jerusalem is a focus. Jordanians, including a former foreign minister, Kamel Abu Jaber, have been invited to participate in advising the Greek Orthodox Patriarch there.⁽²⁸⁾ Moreover, the country of Jordan upholds, in its beliefs as well as its diplomacy, an understanding of Islam as a religion of peace and justice; a tolerant belief system.

The phenomenon of terrorism has been a severe challenge to this understanding, locally and throughout the Middle East. Against those who claim religious justification for terrorist measures, the Jordanian position is clearly stated: "Suicide is not 'martyrdom,' and the killing of innocent people cannot rightly be considered *jihād*, which is best translated as 'a righteous struggle to promote the faith.' True *jihād* in the service of Islam requires respect for human life and respect for treaties. Islam explicitly forbids the killing of civilians, and at its core lie the principles of tolerance and dialogue."⁽²⁹⁾

Consistently with this view, the late King Hussein sought at the highest levels to address the challenge of terrorism through international cooperation, not only to disrupt terrorist organizations but also to address the conditions that lead to frustration, despair, and violence. At a remarkable "Summit of the Peacemakers" held at Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, in March 1996, which was attended by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and President Clinton as well as leaders from the Middle East including Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and the Palestine National Authority President Yasser Arafat, King Hussein declared his belief that "we must shoulder our responsibility

26. "Jordan's top priority Middle East peace—King," full text of His Majesty King Abdullah's interview with ITAR-TASS news agency, *The Jordan Times*, February 20, 2008.

27. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Jordan Cautions Islam on Jerusalem's Shrines," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1992.

28. "Theophilus forms 'special advisory council' with 11 Jordanians," *Jordan Times*, June 14, 2007.

29. "A Commitment to World Peace," The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Foreign Affairs website, online at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/f_affairs5b.html (accessed on November 25, 2007).

and work together to protect the dignity of human beings, whoever and wherever they may be.”⁽³⁰⁾

The September 11, 2001, assault by agents of Osama Bin Ladin on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States made the matter of confronting terrorism, much more urgent, for it focused attention on the Middle Eastern region as a source of international terrorism. It also raised questions about the nature of Islam. In response, on November 9, 2004, Jordan proclaimed *The Amman Message*, rejecting extremism and affirming Islam as a religion of peace. The message was delivered in the presence of King Abdullah II, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammed, by Chief Justice Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al Tamimi at the Hashimiyeen Mosque in a religious ceremony attended by notables and Muslim scholars.

In order to give *The Amman Message* more religious authority, King Abdullah sought the opinions of senior religious scholars from around the world and, at an international Islamic conference in July 2005, there emerged a paper, “Three Points of The Amman Message.” This paper precisely defined who is a Muslim, forbade *takfir* (declarations of apostasy), and set forth preconditions for issuing *fatwas*. This was a significant step, as it was the first time the *Ummah* of Islam had formally “come to such a pluralistic mutual inter-recognition.” The “good news” in it for non-Muslims, it was explained, is that “the safeguarding of the legal methodologies of Islam (the *Mathahib*) meant preserving traditional Islam’s inherent internal ‘checks and balances.’” This assured “balanced Islamic solutions” for essential issues including human rights, women’s rights, religious freedom, legitimate *jihad*, good citizenship of Muslims in non-Muslim countries, and just and democratic government.⁽³¹⁾

While not a panacea for the fragmentation of Islam, or the friction between it and the non-Islamic world, *The Amman Message* and Jordanian diplomatic follow-through surely have had a somewhat moderating effect. Noteworthy as well, as an example of Jordan’s moral diplomacy, are the contributions made by Prince Hassan Bin Talal in the field of inter-religious dialogue, in particular through the World Conference of Religions for Peace of which he remains President Emeritus. In the face of terrorist acts in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and religious extremism in general, Prince Hassan has urged movement toward “the precious terra media, the middle ground of dialogue, which has existed for centuries between faiths.”⁽³²⁾

COMMERCIAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, VISIONARY DIPLOMACY—AND JORDAN

Even more specific to Jordan than the country’s several roles in dealing with the region’s water, peacemaking, and religious problems is its effort to use diplomacy to promote its own national welfare, in economic terms. The Jordanian economy is

30. *Ibid.*

31. “The Amman Message: Summary,” the official website of the Amman Message, online at <http://www.ammanmessage.com> (accessed on December 28, 2007)

32. “Statement by HRH Prince Hassan Bin Talal,” Amman, August 2, 2007, online at <http://www.wcrp.org/news/statements/Amman-02-08-07> (accessed on December 29, 2007).

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small, a condition that imposes special difficulties, many of these related to the issue of scale.⁽³³⁾ With few natural resources or diversity of product, Jordan must engage in trade in order to prosper. To help it become a more attractive trading partner, its government, pushed by King Abdullah II, has undertaken an ambitious program of economic reform, the “National Agenda.” Trade expansion, as well as an increase in foreign direct investment, it was reasoned, would follow from internal reform. At the external level, a significant first step was to join the World Trade Organization, which Jordan did in 2000.

The Jordanian economic strategy has been fairly successful, though it is still very much a work-in-progress. The government’s privatization program, though progressing, is subject to parliamentary delays owing to concern about the policy’s impact on employment and revenue levels. Rising oil prices also are a major worry.⁽³⁴⁾ Because of official US concern about Jordan’s stability, and in appreciation of Jordan’s moderating role in the region, Congress voted in 2001 to approve a United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This was the first such agreement between the United States and an Arab country.⁽³⁵⁾ King Abdullah II together with President Clinton in Washington on October 24, 2000, witnessed the signing of the FTA, which came into effect in December 2001. Since then, Jordanian exports to the United States have increased from very little to \$1.42 billion—“an astounding 1,800%” above the 2000 level of \$73 million, said David A. Sampson, US Deputy Secretary of Commerce, in a speech in Washington to the U.S. Jordan Business Alliance in April 2007. “The Jordan FTA is a model for the region as the United States works to build a Middle East Free Trade Area.” Jordan’s agreement with the United States would also increase its trade and investment relations with other countries. “In this way, an FTA serves as a ‘seal of approval’ for other nations, opening new doors for Jordan in the global marketplace.”⁽³⁶⁾ Indeed, as King Abdullah II himself pointed out in an address in Japan, an important trading partner of Jordan, “Our country is increasingly becoming a hub and gateway

33. “Small Economies: A Literature Review,” Note by the Secretariat, Committee on Trade and Development, Dedicated Session, World Trade Organization, WT/COMTD/SE/W/4, July 23, 2002, online at http://ctr.c.sice.oas.org/TRC/WTO/SmallEcon/SEWr_e.doc. Among the Country groups according to the Commonwealth’s vulnerability index, Jordan is listed as having “lower medium vulnerability.”

34. “Jordan: Economic data,” Country Briefings, Economist Intelligence Unit, October 9, 2007, online at <http://www.economist.com/countries/Jordan> (accessed on February 22, 2008).

35. Jordan also was the first Arab country to become a partner in the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), at the second GNEP ministerial meeting in Vienna in September 2007. U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman made Jordan his first stop in a six-nation visit to the Middle East and Europe in January 2008. “Secretary Bodman Meets with Jordanian Prime Minister to Tout Role of Energy Diversity,” Press Release, Embassy of the United States of America, Amman, January 17, 2008.

36. David A. Sampson, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, speech to the U.S.-Jordan Business Alliance, Washington, DC, April 18, 2007, online at http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/DeputySecretarySpeeches/PROD01_002769 (accessed on December 29, 2007).

for global and regional business.”⁽³⁷⁾ Commercially, Jordan is on the map.

On an even broader diplomatic scale, with a focus on global development, Jordan has launched a remarkable effort, worldwide in extent, to form a whole new category of states: that of *lower middle income countries*. These are countries whose further development is held back by the burden of large debts, limited access to international markets, and a shortage of technical and other know-how. In some instances, the assistance these countries previously had received was lost when they were judged to have “graduated” from lower income status. The coordinator of this Jordanian initiative, Ambassador Farouk Kasrawi, a special adviser to the King and a former foreign minister, has explained: “There is a notion that the more you are successful, the less aid you will get. And we don’t want this to be a punishment for countries who are doing well.”⁽³⁸⁾

King Abdullah II himself first proposed the formation of this intermediate group of states in 2005. The group was created on September 20, 2006. The countries gathered by Jordan were Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay and Sri Lanka—eleven countries, and thus known as the Group of Eleven (G11). At their Summit meeting at a Jordanian Resort on the Dead Sea in May 2007 the G11 partners agreed to press the rich, industrially powerful Group of Eight (G8) countries to cooperate to ease their debt burdens, guarantee greater market access, offer technical and other assistance, alleviate poverty, and, in general, recognize the wisdom of reducing the gap between the rich and the poor in the world.

In order to consolidate the G11 effort, Ambassador Kasrawi was sent on a circuit of travels around G11 country capitals. The G11 initiative coincided with, thematically as well as temporally, a series of other noteworthy Jordanian diplomatic initiatives—engaging Nobel Prize winners, the World Economic Forum, and Israeli-Palestinian-U.S. peace negotiators. This flurry of activity attracted attention. “Analysis: Jordan’s king works overtime,” ran a United Press International headline.⁽³⁹⁾ “For a small country that usually does not make much news,” commented the journalist Rami G. Khouri.

Jordan is making a claim on the world’s attention with a series of fascinating consecutive events. Within the span of a week Jordan is hosting its annual gathering of Nobel Prize laureates at Petra, to bring the world’s best minds to bear on the challenges of peace

37. Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, December 22, 2006, online at http://www.kingabdullah.jo/press_room/speechpage.php?ki_serial=429&menu_id=607&lang_hmka1=1 (accessed on December 12, 2007).

38. “Don’t punish a country’s progress,” *Marketplace*, May 18, 2007, online at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/05/18/dont_punish_a_countrys_progress (accessed on November 25, 2007).

39. Claude Salhani, “Analysis: Jordan’s king works overtime,” United Press International, May 18, 2007, online at http://www.upi.com/International_Intelligence/Analysis/2007/05/18/analysis_jordan_king_works_overtime/4819/.

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and development in the Middle East; then hosts the annual World Economic Forum Middle East gathering that brings together 1200 top business, government and media people from around the world; and it caps off the week with meetings of senior officials from Israel, Palestine and the USA geared to prodding a renewed Arab-Israeli peace-making process, alongside a meeting of the new G-11 group of lower-middle income countries that seeks to spark a new aid, development and reform partnership with the world's great powers.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The sheer ambition of these initiatives for a small state such as Jordan is extraordinary. Some of Jordan's diplomacy may even be said to have a visionary quality. It is not only the large powers –superpowers– that can project visions internationally. One here thinks of President Woodrow Wilson's desire to make the world "safe for democracy."⁽⁴¹⁾ Or President Franklin Roosevelt conceiving a "world of neighbors" not just in the Western Hemisphere.⁽⁴²⁾ There is also a "Hashemite Vision". It is aimed mainly at promoting "the long-term rejuvenation of the Arab world."⁽⁴³⁾ Its scope is potentially even wider, however. Through Jordanian diplomacy, conducted at the highest level, it may help to enable people elsewhere, to see-or at least to glimpse-*the world* as it looks from Amman. King Abdullah during a trip in March 2007 to the United States -a country he knows well from his days as a student at the Eaglebrook School, Deerfield Academy, and Georgetown University- had an opportunity to share his vision with an American and a worldwide audience. He was invited to speak before a joint session of Congress. His objective in that address, which he delivered on March 7, was clearly to persuade the political leaders of the United States to take a more active Middle East peacemaking role. He emphasized the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian problem not just for Jordan but for a vast region, even for the whole world. With reference to that core issue, he stated: "The choice is ours: an open world full of promise, progress and justice for all; or a closed world of divided peoples, fear, and unfulfilled dreams." There are "no bystanders" in the 21st century, "no one who is not affected by the division and hatred that is present in our world," he continued. "Across oceans," the conflict in the Middle East had "estranged societies that should be friends." The whole Muslim world was concerned about Palestine, he told the members of Congress. "I meet Muslims thousands of miles away who have a deep, personal response to the suffering of the Palestinian people."

Just some days before, in Islamabad, he reported, the foreign ministers of key Muslim states had met, "to assure Palestinians and Israelis that they are not alone." Efforts to make and build peace would therefore have Muslim backing. "The goal must be a peace in which all sides gain," the king stated. It must be a peace that will "free young Palestinians" to focus on the future. "It must be a peace that makes

40. Rami G. Khouri, "Jordan and the G-11," Agence Global, May 15, 2007, online at <http://www.ageneglobal.com/article.asp?id=1260> (accessed November 25, 2007).

41. Woodrow Wilson, address before a joint session of Congress, April 2, 1917, in which he sought a declaration of war against Imperial Germany.

42. Franklin D. Roosevelt, inaugural address, March 4, 1933.

43. "The Hashemite Vision," The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Foreign Affairs website, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/f_affairs4.html (accessed on November 24, 2007).

Israel a part of the neighborhood, a neighborhood that extends from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, across the breadth of the southern Mediterranean, to the coast of the Indian Ocean.”⁽⁴⁴⁾ It may not be entirely fanciful to see in this language shades of Roosevelt’s “world of neighbors” conception.

King Abdullah’s geographically referential language had a serious public-diplomatic purpose. It projected a transregional sphere of possible international cooperation. Such images *widen the horizon* of politicians and diplomats too. One of the purposes of diplomacy is to overcome estrangement.⁽⁴⁵⁾ It can overcome distance, in every sense.⁽⁴⁶⁾ This is an imaginative, and not just a technical-diplomatic undertaking. A first step toward mutual understanding, especially across cultures, must be the effort to encompass the situation itself, including the physical situation, to achieve a *common horizon* through, literally, an *exchange of views*. International “political dialogue” –as is today being demonstrated in an especially highly organized way by the participants, including Jordan, in the Euro-Mediterranean (Barcelona) process-usually begins with initial *tours d’horizon*. At successive meetings, the partners around the Mediterranean increasingly become able to see things from the other participants’ point of view.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Something like this maybe was being attempted by King Abdullah, on an even more expansive scale, when he asked members of the US Congress to envision, together with him, a “neighborhood” of mutuality and comity—a community of international discourse and diplomacy extending from “the shores of the Atlantic” to “the coast of the Indian Ocean.” This would embrace Israel, the Palestinians, and the entire Arab and Islamic world, as well as the United States.

JORDAN’S DIPLOMACY AND U.S.-JORDANIAN RELATIONS THROUGH THE IRAQ CONFLICT: A CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT

Can a small state, in this case Jordan, achieve such grand designs, altruistic in character and at the same time rooted in self-interest, in a “Jordan First” policy? Much depends, as was suggested at the outset of this article, on the importance that other countries, neighboring and also far distant, notably the United States, ascribe to the

44. Address by His Majesty King Abdullah II to the Joint Meeting of Congress, Washington, DC, March 7, 2007, online at http://www.kingabdullah.jo/press_room/speechpage.php?ki_serial=440&menu_id=607&lang_hmka1=1 (accessed on December 12, 2007).

45. James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

46. Alan K. Henrikson, “Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach,” *International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique* 23. no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 439-468.

47. Report, 7th Euromed Ministerial Conference: signature of protocols to the Euromed agreement establishing an Association between the EC and their Member States and Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, DG Communication, European Commission, May 31, 2005, online at <http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/services/showShotlist.do?id=67512&lg=en&out=HTML&src=1> (accessed on November 11, 2007). See the stimulating paper by the Maltese scholar, Michelle Pace, “The role of ‘political dialogue’: A dialogic understanding of European-Mediterranean relations,” Second Pan-European Conference, Standing Group on EU Politics, Bologna, June 24-26, 2004, online at <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna/docs/618.pdf> (accessed on January 1, 2008).

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Jordanian state's well-being. In the past, the United Kingdom, and more recently, Japan as well as the United States, have provided Jordan with critical material support. Perhaps no other small country in the world today has been so widely perceived as vitally important, by the great powers as well as by assorted small states, such as Jordan's fellow "S5" members.

Would that support be available, and actually provided, without a proactive Jordanian international role? Here one should perhaps distinguish, analytically, between Jordan's foreign policy per se, which tends to consist of broad "visions," and general "stances" or "positions" taken in response to issues and events, and the conduct of diplomacy proper, i.e., the mechanisms, methods, and men (and, increasingly, women) of Jordan's official representation abroad. As noted, Jordan has a highly expert and impressive diplomatic service. Its members, often educated overseas at American and other foreign universities –and, interestingly, in non-political technical fields such as finance, management, engineering, and computer science –are accomplished, informed, and skilled. They are respected for their breadth of knowledge, intellectual objectivity, and fact-orientation. Their very factualism –and realism– may be a basis of their often-noted "moderation" and "balance."

In the field of formal diplomatic study itself, Jordan's representatives are supported by a network of diplomatic academies and international relations institutes around the world, organized as the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT).⁽⁴⁸⁾ They are an elite, with close ties to the king, the royal court, and the political establishment. Diplomats, as the "face" of a nation to the world, need to represent the entirety of its composition. The development of an enduring *national* Jordanian diplomatic tradition may depend on a further opening up of Jordan's diplomatic service, as well as its political system in general. Its media, too, might be further liberalized, in order to allow a more vigorous debate about Jordan's place in the Middle East and the world—including alternatives to its controversial current orientation in foreign policy toward cooperation with the United States. Freer debate could more fully exhibit the reasons for that orientation, engendering better understanding if not necessarily confirming national agreement.⁽⁴⁹⁾

While it is impossible for a small state, with limited fiscal and human resources, to be represented everywhere, it obviously is important to be present where and when it counts. Jordan has chosen wisely in this respect. In Washington, DC, Jordan, like Sin-

48. The International Forum on Diplomatic Training, and the "Amman Report 2002," online at <http://textus.diplomacy.edu/portals/ifdt/default.asp> (accessed on January 7, 2008).

49. In the latest report of Freedom House regarding "Jordan," it is observed: "Freedom of expression is sometimes restricted. Vaguely worded portions of Article 150 of the penal code and other legislation criminalize certain types of peaceful expression, such as criticism of the royal family, slander of government officials, and speech that harms Jordanian foreign relations, enflames religious sensitivities, or undermines the state's reputation." Arch Puddington, Aili Piano, Camille Eiss, and Tyler Roylance, eds., *Freedom in the World 2007: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* (New York and Washington, DC: Freedom House, and Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p. 416.

gapore has “punched above its weight” diplomatically.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Circumstances do reinforce a diplomatic emissary’s “clout”. Circumstances do, however, reinforce an emissary’s “clout.” But these need to be capitalized upon. Jordan has not invariably done so. During the Gulf conflict of 1990-91, when King Hussein declined to join the United States and its “coalition of the willing” against Saddam Hussein following the Iraqi leader’s invasion of Kuwait, for instance, Jordan found itself seriously at odds with the United States, and Jordanian-American relations were then severely strained.

In contrast, in the Iraq war of 2003, Jordan made a different calculation. A pattern perhaps already had been set by its having strongly supported the United States following the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. Its diplomacy at the American capital, subsequently, prospered. Jordan’s ambassador in Washington at the time and later foreign minister, Marwan Muasher, a computer engineer by profession who had headed the Jordan Information Bureau there during the 1991 Gulf War and was fully familiar with the city’s ways, was well prepared and positioned to act. According to *The Washington Post’s* Nora Boustany, “Marwan Jamil Muasher, 44, is widely seen as the most liked, the most effective and the most credible ambassador from his region, although he landed in diplomacy almost by intuition rather than training. He represents Jordan, one of the smallest and least prosperous Arab countries, but with his ‘quiet dignity’ and consummate professionalism he ambles through Washington’s corridors of power as if he came from a large country with a huge budget, U.S. officials and pundits say.” Boustany further explained: “Jordan, which has spoken out against terrorism without inhibition since September 11th, is the only Arab country to have offered troops for a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.”⁽⁵¹⁾

The Hashemite Kingdom initially had been willing to do more. George Tenet, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency recalled, “To King Abdullah, Bin Ladin was the greatest threat in the world to his nation’s security, and he wanted us to know that Jordan was ready to act as the pointy end of the spear. Like father, like son, I thought. That apple had fallen right next to the tree. How could anyone help but respect the king of Jordan and his family after something like that?”⁽⁵²⁾

Thus well before the third Gulf War in 2003, King Abdullah had aligned himself and his country with the American power. Evidently on the basis of a personal conver-

50. Singapore, although a wealthy country, also has determinedly concentrated its diplomatic resources on key capitals. It maintains relatively few diplomatic missions, uses a large number of honorary consuls; and has employed “roving ambassadors.” See Tommy Koh, *The Quest for World Order: Perspectives of a Pragmatic Idealist*, ed. with an introduction by Amitav Acharya (Singapore: The Institute of Policy Studies and Times Academic Press, 1998), p. 215.

51. Nora Boustany, “Jordanian Envoy Still ‘Talking Straight,’ With a Smile,” *The Washington Post*, December 14, 2001.

52. George Tenet, with Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), p. 156.

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sation with President George W. Bush and perhaps others in Washington, he concluded early on that the American administration was resolved to act decisively against the regime of Saddam Hussein as part of its global “war on terror.” He prepared the Jordanian position accordingly.⁽⁵³⁾ He was reluctant to allow a large number of foreign troops to be placed on Jordanian soil, and declined a formal security relationship with the United States. Yet he did permit US Special Operations Forces to be located near Jordan’s border with Iraq, partly, as later reported by military analysts, “to scour the western Iraqi desert for Scud missiles,” which could be used for attacks on Israel.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The consequences for Jordan of the war in Iraq, given its adjacency to that country, were multidimensional and they were profound. The country was on the front line, and vulnerable. Thousands of Iraqi refugees entered Jordan for safety and also in the hope of employment. Others, no doubt entered for other, nefarious purposes. The political dimensions of the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship were extremely complex.⁽⁵⁵⁾ They were historical as well as current. The Royal Democratic Alliance, a small new political party that appeared in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, called for the restoration of the country’s former Hashemite monarchy and for federation with Jordan, with Abdullah II of Jordan to be the federation’s king.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Other Iraqis resented Jordan because of its previous association with Saddam, including its granting of asylum to two of Saddam’s daughters. These reasons have been cited, speculatively, as explanations of the assault by a powerful car bomb on the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad on August 7, 2003, an event that killed eighteen people. Until that point in the Iraq conflict, it was “the worst attack on a non-military target since the end of formal hostilities.”⁽⁵⁷⁾

A still greater, more direct shock was experienced by Jordan, when on November

53. Jane Perlez, “Jordan Could Suffer From U.S. Assault on Iraq,” *The New York Times*, September 15, 2002; “Jordan prepares for war: Splendid for business too,” *The Economist*, February 13, 2003.

54. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), p. 127. The king’s reservations were attributed mainly to Jordan’s having “a large Palestinian population” (p. 41). Gordon and Trainor write: “The U.S. had wanted to put 14,000 troops in Jordan but had to settle for 5,000. [General Tommy] Franks noted that King Abdullah was under tremendous pressure not to allow U.S. troops on Jordanian soil (p. 110). At the same time, the American military presence was supportive of the king’s position. “‘I promised the King of Jordan we would take care of them and we have not. It is not the legal purview of the President’s advisers to do it. We need to fill Jordan’s tanks,’ Franks added. ‘He is trying to balance his population with our force. We need to support him with what he needs. He is getting F-16s, has to pay overtime and maintain an oil reserve. He is nervous and cranky and sending love notes to me and can’t wait to see me. We will get him everything he needs to keep stability in Jordan’” (p. 111). “See also L. Paul Bremer, with Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 76, which describes a meeting that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Ambassador Bremer had in King Abdullah’s personal office decorated with military items reflecting “his earlier career as commander of the Jordanian special forces.”

55. David Schenker, *Dancing with Saddam*.

56. “Iraq and Jordan: A delicate state of affairs,” *The Economist*, October 4, 2003.

57. Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 170.

9, 2005, there was a coordinated attack on three hotels in Amman—the Grand Hyatt Hotel, the Radisson SAS Hotel, and the Days Inn. Some sixty people were killed and another 115 injured. Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for the attack. For Jordanians the effect of it was traumatic. It was an affront to national honor and pride, as well as a brutal physical assault, and it elicited support both at home and abroad. Jordan’s ambassador, Karim Kawar, interviewed by *The Washington Diplomat* said: “They sought to divide a country and have the population turn against the government, but what they have done is unify our people behind the leadership of his majesty.” The bombings solidified the U.S.-Jordanian relationship as well. “In fact, U.S. support for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is stronger than ever,” commented *The Washington Diplomat*, noting that both President Bush and Mrs. Bush paid a visit to the ambassador to express their sympathies, during which President Bush said: “This enemy must be defeated.”⁽⁵⁸⁾

That goal, however, is a purpose stated negatively. For Jordan, as for the United States, the ultimate objective in the region has to be not “victory,” but peace. More important for the future, for both countries, will be the *positive* expression of common interests, values, and hopes. No country has a larger stake in the situation than Jordan, caught as it is in the middle. “My friends,” stated King Abdullah II in his March 7, 2007, address to the U.S. Congress, “‘a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small.’ That’s how President Roosevelt –the great F.D.R.– described the basis of American foreign policy. He pledged American support for the four freedoms, freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, everywhere in the world.” Applying this Rooseveltian promise to his own region, King Abdullah then said: “Today, the people of the Middle East are searching for these four freedoms.”⁽⁵⁹⁾

For many persons and groups in Jordan and other parts of the Middle East region, the four freedoms –universal ones– may not be found. There are serious internal challenges relating to those subjects within the Jordanian kingdom itself. The greater challenge for the country, however, is external, lying nearby to the east and the west, and in the realm of international relations. The struggle for stability in neighboring Iraq continues and the Palestinian situation has deteriorated. The two-state solution to the problem of Palestine is in question. “There are fears a federation will be forced on Jordan and the Palestinians,” frankly stated Taher al-Adwan, the editor of the Jordanian newspaper *Al Arab Al Youm*.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Jordan’s desire is peace. Yet Jordan’s internal coherence, stability, and progress, including advances in democratization, depend, it

58. Luxner, “Ambassador of Jordan Vows to Stay Course Despite Bombings.”

59. “Address by His Majesty King Abdullah II to the Joint Meeting of Congress.”

60. Michael Slackman, “Arab Leaders Say the Two-State Proposal Is in Peril,” *The New York Times*, February 22, 2008.

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has been suggested, on war and the dangers it poses.⁽⁶¹⁾ The substantial support it receives, from the United States as well as from other sources, is premised in significant part on concern about Jordan's security. Jordan's image as a singular "island of peace" in the midst of regional conflict thus is, politically and diplomatically, a difficult one to maintain.

Nonetheless, King Abdullah is surely right in espousing, as he did when speaking before the United States Congress, the goal of peace. "We have seen the danger and destruction of violence, hatred, and injustice. But we have also seen what people can achieve when they are empowered, when they break down walls, when they commit to the future. And we know that Middle East peace can be a global beginning, creating new possibilities for our region and the entire world."⁽⁶²⁾ To the king, the diplomats, and the people of Jordan—a "little nation," as President Kennedy said—much, to be sure, has been given. To them, also, much is owed for their endeavors. ■

61. Glenn Robinson in his 1998 article, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," writes: "Ironically, what may pose the greatest threat to the democratic transition in Jordan is peace, with the sorts of demographic and political challenges the 1994 agreement with Israel has unleashed. Indeed contrary to the optimistic forecasts found in many of the recent works on civil society, the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well usher in a new era of authoritarianism in Jordan-and elsewhere in the Arab world", pp. 387-388.

62. "Address by His Majesty King Abdullah II to the Joint Meeting of Congress."

Justice Louis D. Brandeis, Professor Felix Frankfurter, and the Balfour Declaration

Bruce Allen Murphy*

Carol L. Wright**

This article is a primarily historical piece that details Justice Louis Brandeis role in the creation of Israel. By presenting little known historical facts questions are raised about the independence of the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of the United States government. While it makes the point that for most of United States History, Supreme Court Justices have been politically active it encourages discussion of the public's expectations of these justices who hold lifetime appointments. The involvement of a Supreme Court Justice in the development of executive and legislative actions as they relate to international relations of the United States may be considered by some to violate the separation of powers. Others may find it in keeping with a tradition of politically engaged Justices exercising their rights as citizens of the United States.

Students of American politics and civics are taught that foreign policy is made by the President, often acting through the Secretary of State and the State Department, and not infrequently critiqued as well as confirmed or disavowed by the United States Senate. But, only a handful of people knew in the early twentieth century that it was a sitting Supreme Court Justice, Louis D. Brandeis, who, with the assistance of his political lieutenant, Professor Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School, and acting through his close friend and benefactor, President Woodrow Wilson, helped to change the history of the Middle East by launching the process that would eventually result in the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.⁽¹⁾

The American system of government rests upon a separation of powers among the three governmental branches: the executive, the legislative and the judicial. While the first two of these are overtly political branches, the third has traditionally been perceived as being above the political fray. Indeed, both the power and

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1. This article has been revised and adapted from Bruce Allen Murphy, *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

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prestige of the courts depend on the public's confidence in its independence, fairness, and impartiality. Paradoxically, judges and justices on the federal courts are selected for life tenure through a highly political process: nomination by the president and confirmation with the advise and consent of the U.S. Senate. For most of the country's history, the nine Supreme Court justices have been chosen from among the ranks of highly politically active individuals who, to one degree or another, were unwilling to abandon their political pursuits while serving on the Court,⁽²⁾ despite unwritten standards of conduct that discouraged such behavior.⁽³⁾ One such justice was Louis D. Brandeis, who served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1916 to 1939. Through his friend and ally, Professor Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School, who would later serve on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1939-1962, Brandeis worked behind the scenes to bring about a host of Progressive domestic reforms, and worked in concert toward furthering the cause of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine.⁽⁴⁾

Louis D. Brandeis's instincts for political reform were a long-time in the making. Born in 1856 in Louisville, Kentucky, Brandeis was the youngest of four children of parents who had immigrated to the United States from Prague. Blessed with high intelligence and a strong work ethic, Brandeis distinguished himself in the Louisville public schools, graduating at age fifteen with a gold medal for excellence. Following Brandeis's high school graduation, his father's grain business fell on hard times, and the family moved to Europe. While there, young Brandeis studied at the Annen Realschule in Dresden where, he would later remember, he learned to think inductively. Upon the family's return to the U.S., Brandeis, who was also much influenced by a brilliant uncle Lewis N. Dembitz, a prominent Louisville attorney, chose to study the law. He became the youngest student at Harvard Law School, affording the tuition by piecing together money from various tutoring and proctoring jobs, supplemented by a loan from an older brother. The school boasted students from some of America's wealthiest families, but Brandeis made do with a frugal and austere lifestyle. Nonetheless in 1877, before reaching the age of twenty-one, he received his law degree having achieved

2. A full examination of the history of extrajudicial activities by Supreme Court justices can be found in the appendix to *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection*, *supra*, pp. 345-363.

3. To protect the integrity of the lower federal courts, the *Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges* was promulgated in 1973 and are periodically revised, most recently in 2000. The first three canons require that: "a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary"; "a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"; and that "a judge should perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently". These canons also offer guidelines regarding extra-judicial activities, stating in canons 4 and 5 that "a judge may engage in extra-judicial activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice," and "a judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties." Canons also specifically state that, "a judge should refrain from political activity." This Code specifically does not apply to justices of the United States Supreme Court.

4. For the detailed political activities of Brandeis and Frankfurter see Bruce Allen Murphy, *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection*.

the highest grade average earned to that point in the history of the school.⁽⁵⁾

Not long after graduation, Brandeis joined his aristocratic Boston Brahmin law school classmate Samuel D. Warren in a law practice in Boston, Massachusetts. The firm prospered with a corporate clientele developed through Warren's wealthy family connections, while Brandeis generated business among the city's rich, immigrant, German Jews. Brandeis developed a respect for New England values of individualism, ruggedness, love of freedom and pragmatism. They fit well with his habitual frugality and natural concern for others. Still, due to anti-Semitism prevailing in Boston, he found it difficult to become integrated into New England society, despite his partner's social connections.⁽⁶⁾

Brandeis held himself to the highest moral standards, and expected no less of others or of the government. On occasion, after winning a case for a client who Brandeis felt was in the wrong, he would lecture him on his need to reform.⁽⁷⁾ In addition, Brandeis formed and led numerous citizen reform organizations, and was one of the first attorneys in the U.S. to take cases, *pro bono publico*, without charging those who could not afford to pay his fee. It was not long before Brandeis became a leader in the Progressive movement, working against monopolies, for trade unions, and against the abuses of the rich at the expense of the worker.⁽⁸⁾

Raised without formal religious training, Brandeis tried to blend in with the Boston Brahmin social elite. He was more culturally than religiously Jewish, not even celebrating Jewish holidays. While he cultivated clients from the Jewish community, Brandeis avoided joining Jewish groups, and did not accept requests to speak at their meetings.⁽⁹⁾ As a Progressive, however, he came to identify with the new wave of East European Jewish immigrants, who were active in various social and liberal reform movements, rather than with the rich German Jews who were his clients. Brandeis saw in these poorer immigrants the personification of the virtues he loved in the American national character and the old New England ways he feared were deteriorating because of monopolistic and dishonest business practices.

Then, in 1910, Brandeis was asked to mediate a New York City garment workers' strike. Through the negotiating process, Brandeis for the first time came to know intimately these first and second generation immigrants who were both labor and management in the dispute. Although he had little in common with either group, through this contact, he came to sense his ethnic kinship with the Jewish people. He saw in their intellect and sense of morality a group of true American citizens with all the idealism, industry, innovation, courage, and commitment to

5. Alpheus T. Mason, *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life*, New York: Viking Press, 1946, pp. 33-48.

6. Allon Gal, *Brandeis of Boston*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 11-22.

7. Ned McClennan, "Louis D. Brandeis as a Lawyer," 33 *Massachusetts Law Quarterly* (1948), pp. 24-25 and *passim*. And David W. Levy, "Lawyer as Judge: Brandeis' View of the Legal Profession," 22 *Oklahoma Law Review* (1969), pp. 391-392, and *passim*.

8. For more on Brandeis's early reform battles, see Mason, *Brandeis*, pp. 99-244; and Gal, *Brandeis of Boston*, pp. 22-28; 46-65; and 96-136.

9. See Gal, *Brandeis of Boston*, pp. 137-207 for more on Brandeis's conversion to Zionism.

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hard work that were part of the New England Yankee spirit.⁽¹⁰⁾

At that time Brandeis had little knowledge of, or sympathy for Zionism. He would frequently receive requests to speak to Jewish groups, but nearly always declined. In 1911, though, he agreed to speak on Jewish democratic idealism before the Menorah Society of Harvard, an organization formed to promote and study Jewish culture and ideals. Subsequently, he agreed to meet with Bernard Rosenblatt from the Federation of American Zionists in 1912. As Brandeis's understanding of Zionism grew, he came to see a connection between it and his brand of politically-reform oriented, domestic, Progressivism. His first public statement on the issue came in the form of a letter to editor Bernard Richards published in *The Maccabean*, a journal of the Federation of American Zionists. While far from a leader of the movement, Brandeis indicated here that he was heading in the direction of becoming a supporter.

In August 1912, Brandeis met with Jacob DeHaas, the editor of the Boston-based newspaper, the *Jewish Advocate*.⁽¹¹⁾ DeHaas had been a secretary to Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, in England, so was well equipped to answer the attorney's questions about Zionism. Brandeis hired DeHaas as his secretary, and learned much from him about the cause during the winter of 1912-13. Still far from active involvement, Brandeis gained a respect for the movement as a form of social idealism.

After attending a speech by East European Zionist leader, Nahum Sokolow, on the nationalist aspects of Zionism on May 30, 1913, Brandeis's support for the movement grew. As Boston, and America, moved toward greater xenophobia and anti-Semitism, Brandeis moved toward Zionism. On April 17, 1913, Brandeis joined the Zion Association of greater Boston, a subgroup of the Federation of American Zionists available for people who saw themselves as Zionists but did not want to be active participants in the cause. Brandeis saw the movement as a social reform effort much like the other Progressive movement ideals he supported. Once a member of the group, it was not long before he was tapped for a leadership position. On August 30, 1914, he was elected chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, an ad hoc organization devoted to aiding Jews in the embattled countries of Europe. His acceptance speech expressed his reasons for supporting the cause:

I feel my disqualification for this task. Throughout long years, which represent my own life, I have been to a great extent separated from Jews. I am very ignorant in things Jewish. But recent experiences, public and professional, have taught me this: I find Jews possessed of those very qualities which we of the twentieth century seek to develop in our struggle for justice and democracy; a deep sense of the brotherhood of man; and a high intelligence, the fruit of three thousand years of civilization.⁽¹²⁾

10. Mason, *Brandeis*, pp. 442-443.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Jacob DeHaas, *Louis D. Brandeis: A Biographical Sketch, with Special Reference to His Contributions to Jewish and Zionist History* New York: Block Publishing Co., 1929, as quoted in Mason, *Brandeis*, p. 445. Also quoted in Gal, *Brandeis of Boston*, p. 206.

More than just those in Boston or New York noticed Brandeis's acute legal mind, moral leadership, and Progressive ideals. Woodrow Wilson, who was elected U.S. President in 1912, shared Brandeis's ideals on many subjects, and relied on Brandeis for practical advice on how to implement their mutual political goals. Still, when President Wilson nominated Brandeis to fill an opening on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916, the opposition from the anti-Semitic elements of the American Bar Association was fierce. At that time, there had never been a member of the Jewish faith appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and some were surprised that Wilson, the son of a Christian minister, would make such a nomination. Moreover, Brandeis had made enemies of the leaders of industry and finance, whose economic excesses he had sought to constrain. They opposed the nomination, worried about the impact the "People's Attorney", as he was now called, might have on their capitalistic interests. Other critics voiced doubt that one who was so politically involved prior to his nomination could become a non-partisan judge. After one of the lengthiest confirmation battles in history, Brandeis was confirmed, and became the first Jewish justice ever to serve on the Supreme Court. Ironically, once on the Court his main legal ally would become Boston Brahmin, Oliver Wendell Holmes. In a series of powerful dissenting and concurring opinions, they would lay the foundation for remaking First Amendment Free Speech case law.

Having endured so much criticism from opponents to his Supreme Court appointment, Brandeis felt compelled to disengage from the many political and reform causes and organizations, both public and private, which had occupied his attention for so long. He resigned from the National Economic League, the Economic Club of Boston, the Massachusetts Civil Service Association, the Boston City Club, the Exchange Club of Boston, the Social Law Library, the Massachusetts Bar Association, and the Bar Association of the City of Boston.⁽¹³⁾ These were clearly political interest groups, membership in which others might view as being improper for a sitting justice. Still, he was reluctant to give up his leadership of the American Zionists. He had helped the movement make great strides in the two years he had been the chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs.⁽¹⁴⁾ Even here, though, Brandeis found that the enemies he had made would oppose him.

He found himself vulnerable because of a dispute among American Zionists

13. Letters, Brandeis to J. W. Beatson, June 16, 1916, Brandeis to Leon Sanders, June 26, 1916, and Brandeis to the Massachusetts Civil Service Association, September 25, 1916, in Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy, *Letters of Louis D. Brandeis*, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975, Vol. IV, pp. 223-237, and 260.

14. For more on the American Zionists and Brandeis, see Mason, Brandeis, chapter XXIX; Ezekiel Rabinowitz, *Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the Zionist Chapter of His Life* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1968); Melvin Urofsky, *American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1975); and Yonathan Shapiro, *Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897-1930* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971).

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that went back to the previous year, 1915. Brandeis had supported the idea of forming a democratically elected American Jewish Congress, to discuss issues of importance to the Jewish people. The American Jewish Committee, representing the wealthier American Jews, did not support a group where representatives of the less affluent would dilute their influence. Before Brandeis's appointment to the Court, though, his side seemed to have won the battle, and the new Congress was about to be formed.

The American Jewish Committee, however, was not ready to admit defeat. They invited Brandeis and his lieutenants to a conference on July 16 at the Hotel Astor, ostensibly to appeal for unity. The meeting was anything but unifying, however, as Brandeis and the others were subjected to insults from the audience. Two days later, an editorial denounced Brandeis in *The New York Times*, then owned and operated by influential Jews who were associated with the American Jewish Committee. The incident was extremely embarrassing for Brandeis, who had been on the Supreme Court only six weeks. Brandeis officially resigned from the Zionist movement and ended his open association with other Jewish relief organizations, in order to forestall any further adverse impact on the Court.

While disengaging publicly from all political activity, Brandeis found it impossible to disengage privately. He wanted his leadership of the Progressive and Zionist movements to continue, but he realized that it had to be undertaken from behind-the-scenes. Brandeis decided that in order to be able to act freely in the political sphere he would need to do so by proxy. He began to consider whom he might be able to enlist as a lieutenant to be his political "eyes and ears" and to help implement his programs both in foreign and domestic policy. He required someone in whom he had complete confidence as to ability and sense of discretion, but who was also well connected in important circles. In addition, he hoped for a philosophical ally, a kindred spirit. Fortunately for the justice, there was such a person—a thirty-three year old professor at the Harvard Law School, Felix Frankfurter.

Frankfurter was born in Austria into a Jewish family. His father brought the family to the U.S. when young Felix, who at the time did not speak a word of English, was age twelve. The family faced financial struggles in their adopted homeland, but Frankfurter's natural intelligence and willingness work hard enabled him to succeed at Harvard Law School as a law student, at a level very close to Brandeis's accomplishments, and then as a lawyer in Boston. He was so remarkable that at age 31 he became a professor at Harvard Law School. A political symbiosis bound him to Brandeis. They shared political and social goals, but while Brandeis was limited by his position on the Court, Frankfurter enjoyed a freedom to participate in political activities, and even to involve his students or former students in whatever projects he chose. While Brandeis had become wealthy through his successful law practice, the young professor was of more modest means. Thus, throughout Brandeis's tenure on the Court, he sent ideas and financial support to

Frankfurter, who would use them to pursue various items of their mutual concern. This association enabled Frankfurter to hire others to pursue projects suggested and funded by Brandeis. Frankfurter developed a network of former law students to assist them, eventually placing many of his protégés in positions in government, especially during the New Deal years of the 1930s, to effectively promote reforms in governmental, economic, and social spheres.

One of the projects that both Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter continued to favor was the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Even after the Hotel Astor ambush in 1916 had forced him to resign as official head of the American Zionist movement, Brandeis still continued as an advocate for the cause, albeit less publicly. With Frankfurter interceding, Brandeis forwarded advice to the new official leaders of the American Zionists—Judge Julian W. Mack and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.⁽¹⁵⁾ Despite all of their efforts, however, the complexity of events in the international arena had dampened the prospects for establishing a Jewish homeland.

In 1916, Palestine was part of Turkey, one of the Central Powers in World War I. While the U.S. had not yet entered the war, Great Britain and France had already secretly negotiated the Sykes-Picot agreement, which arranged for the division of Palestine between them once the war had ended with their presupposed victory. Unaware of this, World Zionist Organization (WZO) leader Chaim Weizmann had been negotiating for over a year with British officials to declare their support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, without getting more than vague promises. He also tried working with the French, who did nothing to encourage him.⁽¹⁶⁾

Weizmann believed that a push from the United States government might tip the scales with British officials, so he contacted Brandeis, whom he knew to be an American Zionist leader with much influence within the Wilson Administration. Weizmann told the Justice “an expression of opinion coming from yourself and perhaps other gentlemen connected with the Government in favor of a Jewish Palestine under a British protectorate would greatly strengthen our hands.”⁽¹⁷⁾ Likely because of his close friendship with the President combined with his interest in this issue, Brandeis saw no separation of powers issues preventing this conversation from happening.

Shortly after the United States entry into the war in 1917, Brandeis met with President Wilson to discuss the question of a Jewish homeland. Brandeis briefed the president on the issue, after which Wilson stated that he “was entirely sympathetic to the aims of the Zionist Movement, and that he believed that the Zionist

15. For more in this, see Melvin I. Urofsky, *American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1975); and Robert Silverberg, *If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem* (New York: Pyramid Books 1970).

16. Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1949, pp. 149-150, 238-239.

17. Silverberg, *O Jerusalem*, pp. 85-86. The British were privately rethinking their position.

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formula, to establish a publicly assured, legally secured homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, would meet the situation; that from the point of view of national problems generally, he approved and would support the recognition of the nationality.”⁽¹⁸⁾ So persuaded was the President that he ended by “expressing himself in agreement with the policy, under England’s protectorate, for a Jewish Homeland,”⁽¹⁹⁾ and promised that any statement he might make on this matter would be first drafted by Brandeis. However, Wilson was not willing to make such a pronouncement until he could first persuade the French to abandon their hegemonic interests in the area.

British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour invited Brandeis to meet with him the following day. Adding to Brandeis’s optimism about Wilson’s support for Zionist goals was the assurance he received from Balfour of considerable support within the British government for that cause. Brandeis and Balfour agreed that the next step was to secure the support of the United States government for a British declaration on this matter.⁽²⁰⁾

Brandeis knew that Wilson was not yet ready to go public with such a statement.⁽²¹⁾ He learned why when, in the summer of 1917, Wilson supported a plan by Henry Morgenthau, a former ambassador to Turkey, to negotiate with that country, hoping to convince it to withdraw from the war. Any such effort to persuade them would preclude any prospect of severing Palestine from the Ottoman Empire. Brandeis was able to keep track of the negotiations through Felix Frankfurter, who was placed on the diplomatic team.⁽²²⁾ To manage the public relations issues that could arise, the justice arranged that news releases for the mission would be drafted by both Frankfurter and Morgenthau, and sent to Brandeis and Robert Lansing for review before being released.⁽²³⁾ Despite Morgenthau’s prior diplomatic experience, however, he failed in this initiative, and Wilson, at Frankfurter’s urging, recalled the team.⁽²⁴⁾

Simultaneously, the British government took a step toward supporting Zionism. Two contradictory views of what would benefit British Jews were then prevalent within British society. Zionists favored the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine under British protection, while anti-Zionist Jews feared that a Jewish state might have an adverse effect on their British citizenship. After considerable negotiation, the two groups were able to draft a joint declaration

18. Memorandum by Jacob DeHaas, May 9, 1917, quoted in Rabinowitz, *Brandeis*, p. 63.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Letter, Brandeis to DeHaas, May 8, 1917, in Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol. IV, p. 290.

21. Letter, Brandeis to DeHaas, May 10, 1917, in Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol. IV, p. 90.

22. William Yale, “Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s Special Mission of 1917,” *I World Politics*, pp. 308-320.

23. Letter, Brandeis to Jacob DeHaas, June 7, 1917, in Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol. IV, p. 296.

24. Urofsky, *American Zionism*, p. 209.

favoring Palestine.⁽²⁵⁾ The draft declaration was then sent to Washington in the hope that President Wilson would support it. However, Wilson said on September 11, 1917 that the time was “not opportune” to commit himself to it.⁽²⁶⁾ Within two weeks, however, the president would apparently show a willingness to reverse his stance, an action that has been the subject of considerable speculation by scholars.⁽²⁷⁾ The unpublished diaries of Wilson’s close adviser, “Colonel” Edward M. House reveal that Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis was instrumental in helping the president to change his position.

Sensing that events were at a crossroads, Weizmann solicited Brandeis for more help. He cabled a copy of an earlier, much stronger draft of the declaration, telling the justice that it “would greatly help if President Wilson and yourself [sic] would support text.”⁽²⁸⁾ In response, Brandeis and Rabbi Wise met with Colonel House on September 23 in the hopes of securing his support for the stronger statement.⁽²⁹⁾ With House’s assistance, Brandeis drafted a private cable to Weizmann, a message that has been described as, “probably one of the most important LDB ever wrote.”⁽³⁰⁾

From talks I have had with the President and from expressions of opinion given to closest advisers I feel I can answer you in that he is [in] entire sympathy with declaration quoted in yours of nineteenth as approved by foreign office and the Prime Minister. I of course heartily agree.⁽³¹⁾

Colonel House still believed that the president should not make any public statement regarding the subject, despite the president’s willingness to “go further than [he] thought advisable” on the issue.⁽³²⁾ House also recommended that the Zionists should “bring the French, Italian and Russian governments as near the attitude of Great Britain and the United States as was possible and then leave the matter there.”⁽³³⁾ Justice Brandeis forwarded House’s advice to Weizmann the next day.⁽³⁴⁾

25. , pp. 204, 210-211.

26. Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol IV, p. 310.

27. See Richard N. Lebow, “Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration,” 40 *Journal of Modern History*, (1968), pp. 501-523.

28. Letter, Chaim Weizmann to Brandeis, September 19, 1917, Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol., II, p. 310.

29. House Diaries, September 22, 1917, House Manuscripts, Vol. II, Box 45, p. 286-287, Sterling Library, Yale University.

30. Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol. IV, p. 311.

31. Letter, Brandeis to Weizmann, September 24, 1917, House Manuscripts, Box 18, Sterling Library, Yale University.

32. House Diaries, September 23, 1917, House Manuscripts, Vol. II, Box 45, p. 290, Sterling Library, Yale University.

33. Letter, Brandeis to Weizmann, September 24, 1917, House Manuscripts, Box 18, Sterling Library, Yale University.

34. Letter, Brandeis to House, September 24, 1917, House Manuscripts, Box 18, Sterling Library, Yale University.

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Despite Brandeis's assurances, Weizmann was concerned about losing support for the declaration in England. Anti-Zionists lobbied to prevent any formal statement on the subject from the government, while the Americans still hoped for a separate peace with Turkey, and hesitated to do anything to jeopardize it.⁽³⁵⁾ Weizmann felt that what was needed was a definite, public support of a Jewish homeland coming from the U.S., and that it was needed soon. In a long letter to Brandeis on October 7, 1917, Weizmann said:

I have no doubt that the amended text of the declaration will be again submitted to the President and it would be most invaluable if the President would accept it without reservation and would recommend the granting of the declaration now.⁽³⁶⁾

Weizmann felt that even a weak declaration supporting a Jewish homeland was better than none, but Brandeis was not convinced. As Weizmann predicted, shortly thereafter the British Foreign Office sent the weaker statement to President Wilson, calling it a "final" draft. Wilson had the statement delivered to the American Zionist leaders, Louis Brandeis, Jacob DeHaas, and Stephen Wise, and asked for their comments. The three men redrafted the statement, strengthening the wording to be more like the first version. On October 16, 1917, Colonel House notified the British of Wilson's approval of this revised statement, but he reserved the right to make this announcement public at a time of the president's own choosing.⁽³⁷⁾ Just over two weeks later on November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour released the historic British declaration in favor of a Jewish homeland that came to be known as the Balfour Declaration.

His majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best efforts to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.⁽³⁸⁾

As great an accomplishment as the declaration was, it alone was not enough to ensure creation of a Jewish homeland. Assimilationists in the U.S. and Europe still feared its impact. Brandeis helped to fend off their attacks, working through his allies in the Zionist Organization of America: Felix Frankfurter, Judge Julian Mack, Jacob DeHaas, Robert Szold, Stephen S. Wise, and Bernard G. Flexner.⁽³⁹⁾ Then, in 1919, President Wilson, acceded to Brandeis's urging through his lieutenants, and publicly expressed America's agreement with the Balfour Declaration.⁽⁴⁰⁾

These efforts were far from the last made by Brandeis and Frankfurter to secure a Jewish homeland. For the remainder of his life, Brandeis continued to

35. Silverberg, *O Jerusalem*, pp. 92-93.

36. Letter, Weizmann to Brandeis, October 7, 1917, quoted in Rabinowitz, *Brandeis*, pp. 68-71.

37. Urofsky, *American Zionism*, p. 212.

38. Text quoted in Urofsky, *American Zionism*, pp. 212-213.

39. Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol. IV, p. 301.

40. Urofsky and Levy, *Brandeis Letters*, Vol. IV, pp. 354-355.

offer advice and counsel to various presidents and Zionist leaders seeing to fulfill the promise offered by the Balfour Declaration. After an illustrious career as a Harvard Law Professor, Felix Frankfurter received a nomination from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to fill the seat on the U.S. Supreme Court vacated by the recent death of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo. Frankfurter was sworn in as a justice on the Supreme Court on January 30, 1939. His pleasure at joining his mentor on the Supreme Court was short-lived, however, as Brandeis retired from his seat on the Supreme Court two weeks later, having passed the torch to his loyal and capable ally.

After Brandeis died in 1941, Felix Frankfurter continued to pursue many of the causes they had championed together. Frankfurter remained in touch with Zionist leaders, including Chaim Weizmann, to keep himself informed about the progress of the cause, but, while he was even more involved in extrajudicial, domestic political activities than his mentor, he was not as actively involved in the international Zionism effort as he had been under Brandeis's direction.⁽⁴¹⁾ Then, in late 1942, Jan Karski, a Polish Underground activist briefed Frankfurter on the atrocities of the holocaust. Frankfurter found the reports so horrific that he was unable to assimilate the information, saying, "A man like me talking to a man like you must be totally frank. So I must say: I am unable to believe you."⁽⁴²⁾

Eventually, though, Frankfurter and the world came to know that what Karski had said was all too true, and the need for a safe home for the Jews even more apparent. Later, during the United Nations debate in 1947 on the establishment of the State of Israel, Frankfurter personally lobbied the president of the Philippines by telegram to encourage a vote in favor of the resolution. When a report of this activity became public, however, Frankfurter made an elaborate denial of such involvement.⁽⁴³⁾ Whether he was willing to publicly admit his involvement or not, Frankfurter helped to fulfill the promise his mentor, Louis D. Brandeis, had secured: the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine in 1948. ■

41. Joseph Lash, ed., *From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975, pp. 152-54, 200-201, 203-5, 208, and 243-244.

42. Thomas E. Wood and Stanislaw M. Janowski, *Karski: How One Man Tried to Stop the Holocaust*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994.

43. See Walter Mills, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, New York: The Viking Press, 1951, pp. 357-359.

This article sheds new light on the historical, social, political and military roots of the Darfur issue in which the historical overlaps with the social, the ethnic with the racial and the military with the political. It also critically examines the Arab-Governments' and People's attitudes towards the conflict in Darfur. The article argues that the conflict, has put Sudan on the verge of partition, and warns that without reaching a solution that takes into account the interests of all the parties involved, the whole country might fall apart.

The Darfur crisis is, currently, one of the most important international issues. It has drawn the attention of the whole world through media, international bodies and the activities of human rights organizations. Despite the fact that there are many hot spots in the world, both visible and hidden, the Darfur crisis imposed itself as an internal issue in a country like the United States of America. It was internationalized in no time, thanks to powerful and widespread media, international civil society organizations and countries with conflicting interests. It is worthwhile noting here, that the civil war in the south which started in 1955, and lasted for almost half a century before ending with a comprehensive peace treaty in Nivasha in 2005, could not attract as much attention as that given to Darfur. Globalization as well as the policy of hegemony practiced by the only superpower in the world has played an important part in this regard; media and communications made the world a global village in the real sense of the word. The objective of the post-cold war policies is to achieve safety and security, as a prelude, to imposing a one economy and one market system. All these factors contributed to giving the Darfur crisis, which we thought was a local issue, wide regional and international dimensions.

The Darfur crisis is a typical example of the failure of newly independent states, like Sudan, to build up a powerful nation-state that is capable of peacefully absorbing all forms of multiculturalism and multiethnicity in one unified entity. Sudan is a vast country, with an area of almost one million square miles (two and a half million square km), it is bordered by nine countries, and its climate ranges between desert and equatorial. With a population of 35 million, Sudan is inhabited by Moslems, Christians, Pagans and Animists. It comprises up to 50 main ethnic groups, which consist of around 597 tribes and clans that speak about 115 written or spoken languages.⁽¹⁾

It goes without saying that cultural multiplicity could be a source of strength

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1. Mohammad Sulaiman Mohammad, *Sudan: War of Resources and Identity*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge publications, 2000, p. 113.

for a viable nation-state, provided it is well understood, yet it could also cause destructive disputes. It all depends on the capabilities of the political elites as well as the role of the political parties, the civil society organizations and the educational and cultural systems in consolidating the sense of national belonging. However, Sudan, which was ruled by various successive regimes throughout the past years, has tended to repeat its failed experience in building a nation-state capable of achieving independent and balanced growth. This is manifested by its failure to achieve national unity in a multicultural state.

WHAT IS DARFUR?

Darfur is situated in the far west of Sudan, bordered by Libya, Chad and Central Africa. With an area of about 500 thousand square kilometers, it is inhabited by 6 to 7 million people; that is, one fifth of the total population of the country. This region witnessed the establishment of the Fur Sultanate in the mid seventeenth century at the hands of Sultan Suleiman, a descendant of the Kera dynasty that boasts Arab ancestry, after forcing local (African) tribes such as Tunjur and Daju to move away from power. The Sultanate lasted until 1874, when the Turkish Administration (1821-1885) invaded Darfur and toppled Sultan Ibrahim, the last ruler in that era. The Mahdist revolution (1885-1898) took hold of Darfur, but with the defeat of Mahdism in 1898, the Sultanate was regained during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, and Darfur remained independent until 1916, when it was annexed by the British Administration. During the First World War, Sultan Ali Dinar tried to contact Al Bab Al Aali (Istanbul) to declare that Darfur, being a Moslem Sultanate, backs Turkey against the Allies. It was in that year that Darfur was annexed and became a province within the borders of Sudan.⁽²⁾

The Fur sultans embraced Islam and were keen to spread it in the area. The Sultanate inhabitants, at least the ruling elite and the scholars, spoke both Arabic and Fur. The area was inhabited by more than one hundred tribes as well as different ethnic groups that were usually divided into Arab and non-Arab tribes (the indigenous people); a division based on the ethnic, geographical or the economic status of these tribes; that is, according to the social division of work, as there are some professions that are linked, exclusively, with certain tribes. This classification is controversial, however, as it is difficult to determine who is a “genuine” Arab in Darfur. Some prefer to talk about tribes that have Arab or Arabised ancestry, arguing that Arabism is a cultural rather than an ethnic concept, and that whoever speaks Arabic is mostly an Arab.

Arab presence was larger in the northern part of Darfur, with its desert nature, which allowed Arab tribes to practice their traditional profession; shepherding.

2. Darfur Report 2006, Khartoum, Sudanese Studies Centre, 2006, pp. 16-24.

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The northern Arabs were named “Abbalah” because of their economic interest in camels, whereas those who moved southwards toward Jabal Murrah, were given the name of “Baggarah”; that is, the cow owners; which later became the name of the “Baggarah” tribe that comprises four main groups, namely: Ta’aisheh, Banu Halba, Habayneh and the Rizeigat, which has a strong presence in northern Darfur and Chad. It comprises the Mahariah, the Mahameed, the Otaifat and the Oreiqat.

The non-Arab groups comprise such influential tribes as the Fur, the Daju, The Zaghawa, the Barqad, the Massalit, the Tama and the Maidoub. The Fur tribes which lived in the area surrounding Jabal Murrah relied on rain in cultivating their land. The Fur Sultanate has known the “Hawakeer” system; an Arabic word derived from “Ihtikar”, which means monopoly, according to which the Sultan had the right to grant the chieftains pieces of land that soon become private properties for the tribes whose members have the right to cultivate, while the chieftains have the right to collect taxes as well as shares from the production of this piece of land known as “Hakura”. Other parts of the Sultanate, especially those which lacked fertility or were not fit for cultivation, were regarded as collective properties from which all tribe members can benefit. These were mainly pasturelands. The “Hakuras” are different in size; sometimes a small piece of land was granted to a scholar to be his own source of living.⁽³⁾

THE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THE DARFUR CRISIS

Some observers reduce the conflict in Darfur to a mere dispute over poor and diminishing natural resources, which is controversial. Competition over resources could be the main cause for the problem, but there were other factors that helped to give priority to this one. Some researchers have adopted a Khaldounian analysis for the crisis which regarded it as a conflict between Bedouins and city dwellers, or, more precisely, between the nomads and the settled farmers. The crisis is, in fact, the outcome of a long process of traditional conflict between the herdsmen and the farmers in the region. Yet the same conflict comes, this time, in different political circumstances and within a more complicated regional and international environment, which makes it more than a limited, addressable dispute. In the past, reconciliation meetings held by the tribes were capable of reaching a peaceful solution for the dispute, but the traditional dispute has now become an item on the agenda of the UN Security Council in New York.

3. Musa Adam Abdel Jaleel, “Land Property and the Use of Ethnic Disputes in Darfur,” Cited in Abdel Ghaffar Mohammad Ahmad and Laif Manger, *Darfur, the Region of Ordeal – Problems of Location and Conflict of Identities*. Translated by Mohammad Ali Gadeen, Burgin University, Ruwaq Publications, pp. 49-57.

Analyzing the conflict as one between herdsmen and farmers would have been correct some years ago; that is, directly after independence in 1956, but the continuity and persistence of the conflict is an indication that there are deficiencies in governance, in management and in the economy. Despite the fact that British colonization has ended more than half a century ago, the legacy of colonialism is unjustifiably used to explain the current problems. The Hawakeer system that was created hundreds of years ago, can never have such an impact on relations among the citizens in Darfur today as it did before. Also developmental and administrative issues were ignored, which further aggravated the problem; Darfur was peripheral and isolated, and had a feeling of autonomy, a feeling that was deepened by the British when Darfur was included in the policies of the “closed regions” of 1933, together with the South and Nuba mountains. After independence, development continued to be neglected and the people of the region were excluded from political partnership; the Darfurs were not appointed in high and influential posts in the national governments, even after the Sudanization of the posts after the British departure, shortly before 1956.

The Hawakeer system resulted in depriving the Arab tribes of their right to own and cultivate land; being nomadic and mainly herdsmen they do not tend to own small pieces of land as private property, and prefer, instead, wide areas to move in freely. The traditional tribal system was capable of organizing the relations between the herdsmen and the farmers according to certain norms, which proved to be mostly effective, despite some hostile acts which took place every now and then. The disputes centered on the ownership of land, water resources and pastureland. The land continued to be owned by non-Arab tribes that allowed the Arab tribes to have access to water and grass, through certain paths and tracks within the Hawakeer, so that cows could pass without harming the plants. They also allowed the herdsmen to use their land after harvest time and benefit from the remains of the planted areas, which the farmers regarded as helpful in fertilizing the land. The chieftains and “mayors” of villages succeeded in controlling their people and even punished them in cases of attacks or clashes.⁽⁴⁾

Environmental, administrative and political factors helped to complicate and aggravate the situation, especially after independence; drought and desertification stroked the Savanna area of which north Darfur is a part. The fact that the African coast has dried up led to migrations as well as demographic changes. The large Zaghawa tribe, was among the most affected, as many of its members migrated to settled areas. Frictions with the local farmers were inevitable. The previous seasonal and organized movement between north and south came to a halt, which led the Zaghawas to attempt to settle in the originally narrow land used by the Furs in Jabal Murrah. This, as well as the environmental transformations, resulted

4. *Ibid*, p. 58.

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in great imbalances in distributing the lands and properties the tribes own, which led to disputes, mainly between The Baggaras (herdsmen) and the Fur tribes. The disputes spiraled up when the Abbalas and thirty other Arab tribes joined forces to fight the Furs, the largest tribe in the area, and then the Massalits, another non-Arab tribe, in a later stage. Ever since, the traditional tribal dispute, which was recurrent in the history of the region, started to take the form of an ethnic conflict, and a new terminology came to be used in which it was described as a conflict between Arabs and Zurqas. This development which started in the early eighties of last century, was a serious turning point in the Darfur crisis.⁽⁵⁾

The Darfurs started to feel that they were neglected by the central government at a stage dating back to 1964, when the Darfur Renaissance Movement was formed under the leadership of Ahmad Ibrahim Draij, who could break the monopoly of the Al Ummah party on the Darfur electoral constituencies. He became the opposition leader, before being appointed a minister in the central government. The region could find a better opportunity to express its injustices and, relatively, take part in the political process during periods of democracy, as it is well known that the democratic system, which is based on party and political competition, minimizes tribal and ethnic polarization. It is true that political parties depend on chieftains and heads of clans, yet they present themselves as leaders of parties with programs according to which they compete. Sudan, has known free elections during short periods of democracy, which were often disrupted by military coups. Continuity of the democratic experience could have helped much in the national unification process and helped Sudan avert problems of tribal disputes.

A new factor leading to tension and disputes about jobs in Darfur emerged with the implementation of the Autonomous (regional) Rule System, which was tried by Jaafar Numairi who ruled Sudan between 1969 and 1985, and the federal system applied by the ruling elite that took power June 30, 1989, which heated the competition for the positions in the autonomously ruled regions. The objective was further participation in, and development of, the Autonomous Rule System. However, the totalitarian regimes of Sudan annulled the Civil Administration System, that was based on direct relations between the government, the chieftains and heads of the clans, without being able to impose the new system. The new system was resisted by the local people who refused to cooperate with the new administrators. The new administrative regulations could not solve the problems; instead, they further complicated the situation. The government tried to demarcate the tribal existence according to the status quo, which meant that the displaced and the immigrants would become owners of tribal land at the expense of the settled tribes. Such developments led to mutual struggle that was exacerbated by large

5. Mustafa Babiker, "Dispute and the Reduction of Disputes, Some Primary Ideas." Cited in *Darfur, the Region of Ordeal – Problems of Location and Conflict of Identities*, pp. 102-105. The term Zurqa here means black.

quantities of arms which infiltrated into the area as a result of the Chadian wars, making it easier to get all kinds of weapons in Darfur.

ETHNICIZATION STEPS UP THE CONFLICT

Conflict in Darfur has taken on a racial and ethnic stamp, as a result of the absence of modern forms of organization, such as political parties, federations and trade unions. The revolutionary totalitarian regimes that ruled the country, contributed to this setback through encouraging and deepening divisions and consolidating tribal allegiances. These regimes also focused on ethnic and racial differences by using the policy of “divide and rule” that was adopted by the British, in the Civil Administration System; the totalitarian regimes looked for an alternative to party pluralism and ideological loyalties to fill up the political vacuum resulting from dissolving political parties, trade unions and civil society organizations. The current ruling regime worked actively among the tribes and the civil administration employees, and instead of taking an impartial stand, it sided conspicuously with certain tribes and ethnic groups, favoured them and gave them privileges and prioritized them for opportunities in the executive bodies. It even armed some tribes and supplied them with money, including some tribes that used to be loyal to Al Ummah and the Democratic Unionist parties.

The currently applied federal system accelerated the racial and ethnic fight to control the regional authority, a step that led to ethnicization of the conflict and camouflaged the political and developmental causes of it. It is noticeable in this respect that despite the talk about the developmental injustices and the use of such concepts as marginalization, the Arab Nilotic Centre dominated the rest of Sudan and kept the south, the west and east in a state of backwardness, and predominantly focused on the ethnic factor. Ethnicization, however, was coupled with a sort of racial superiority ideology adopted by the majority of those Sudanese who claim to have Arab origins. Such an ideology spread widely among the Arabs in Darfur as they felt threatened by those of African origin there. Some even recalled the massacre of the Arabs in Zanzibar in 1964.

The beginnings of the Arab/Zurqa polarization date back to the early eighties of last century, when seeds of a racial Arab ideology were sown during the election process of a governor for the region in 1981. The Arab candidates failed to unify themselves in one bloc, which led to the smashing success of Ibrahim Ahmad Draij, who belonged to the Fur tribe. The Arabs in Darfur thought that they had been unified and brought the Zaghawas and the Fallatas to their ranks, seeking to achieve an absolute majority. That period witnessed the distribution of leaflets and tapes issued by the Arab Bloc, warning that the Zurqas in Darfur had controlled the region for a long time and that it was time the Arabs had their share in power. The Arab Bloc was officially announced in a memorandum, signed by 23 Arab notables, sent to then prime minister, Sadiq Al Mahdi, on October 5,

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1987. The Arab notables protested against alleged injustices and complained that the Arabs who represent 70 per cent of the population of the region, were not proportionately represented in the executive and legislative bodies. After appointing Al Tijani Al Sissi, a Fur, a governor of Darfur, some leaflets called for sabotaging the Sissi government by all means possible. The distribution of these leaflets coincided with a statement or a manifesto issued by what was termed as Quraish(1), which some believed was the seed that grew to be known as the Janjaweed. After a while, other leaflets were distributed in the name of Quraish(2), defining the year 2020 for achieving its own plan for accomplishing the objectives of the Arab Bloc that had, by that time, taken on an apparent Islamic fundamentalist dimension. The Arab Bloc had its supporters in Khartoum and within the ruling elite.⁽⁶⁾

The Arab groups benefited from the civil war in the south; the central governments tried to manipulate them into confronting the attacks of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by John Garang. Ironically enough, Sadiq Al Mahdi, during his premiership, 1986–1989, was the first to allow arming the Arab tribes to make them a people's army backing the Sudanese armed forces. Yet Al Mahdi did not go as far, in implementing the idea, as the leaders of the coup that toppled him. These were more daring in implementing the idea; they totally ignored the opposition. Soon after the coup in 1989, the people's defense army was formed by recruits from all parts of Sudan, not only the western part. The militias soon had their own legal status and a little later, in the early nineties, the Darfurs heard, for the first time, of a militia called Janjaweed; a word consisting of three Arabic syllables which means a horseman who carries GM3. The Janjaweed acted as an alternative to the people's defense army, which made people link the Janjaweed with the regime. It was natural then for the non-Arab groups to organize their members and look for an ideology of their own to convince their supporters with. Some people talked about the establishment of the Greater Zaghawa State including the branches of the tribe living in Sudan and Chad. It is worthwhile mentioning here that the Zaghawas were targets of attacks and atrocities committed by the Janjaweed, particularly between 1994 and 1996.

The Furs and the Zaghawas began to organize themselves as of 2001; but the government forces and the Janjaweed launched several military campaigns against them during 2002, to prevent them from achieving any form of tribal-political unification. This was the start of the storm that has swept Darfur since 2003; in February 2003 a group calling itself "The Darfur Liberation Front" issued a *communiqué* about an attack it said it launched on an area called Qulu in Jabal Murrah. This group later adopted the name, "Sudan Liberation Movement", which is still used by the allied forces of the Furs and the Zaghawas.

6. Ata El Bathani, "Towards a Plan to Defining Types and Stages of Conflict in Darfur", cited in *Darfur, the Region of Ordeal – Problems of Location and Conflict of Identities*, p. 85.

The security organs in Khartoum underestimated the capabilities of the movement and those of its army and predicted it would disappear in no time, yet the movement did not, both for external and internal reasons. It split for tribal as well as personal reasons into two factions: that of Meni Arko Minawi (Zaghawa) who was elected in the “Haskanita” conference; and that of Abdel Wahid Mohammed Ahmad Nour (Fur), who is the founding leader of the movement.

The Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim was the second armed opposition group. Most of its members were supporters of the Islamic Front led by Hassan Al Turabi, but they left the Islamic movement in protest against the Islamic government’s policies toward Darfur. The movement witnessed further splits, yet it succeeded, together with other groups, in forming an organization called, “The Salvation Front”, which decided to continue armed struggle after the Abuja agreement of 2006. It is now the main group that rejects the agreement, and leads the opposition for either modifying it or reaching a new one.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT

The Sudanese regime stepped up its operations in Darfur, assisted by the Sudanese Air Force, the Janjaweed, and the Sudanese Military Intelligence, in 2003; that is, soon after signing the peace protocols with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2002. This meant that the SPLM could eventually gain influence that would make it a model for the other armed movements in Sudan. It was no secret, however, that the SPLM helped the Sudan Liberation Movement in Darfur. Stepping up the war attracted the attention of world media and public opinion outside Sudan; the Darfurs exerted great efforts to make their case to the world at a time the world was following up the peace negotiations between north and south and giving more attention to the Sudanese affairs including the news about a human tragedy in Darfur.

Colin Powell, then US secretary of state, visited Sudan in 2004, and was the first to announce that what was going on in Darfur was an act of genocide, and called the Darfur crisis as the crime of the century. The term “genocide” has a great emotional impact on the feelings and attitudes of the Westerners; it brings to their minds the Holocaust and the Rwanda massacres, which explains the interest of the Jewish communities and the active role played by the neo-conservatives in supporting the Darfur issue through their calls for protecting the Darfurs and bringing those who caused the tragedies and committed the massacres to court. The Darfur crisis became an item on the program of many Western political forces, and the streets of European and American cities flooded with processions of protesters showing solidarity with Darfur. Some believed that the media have exaggerated coverage of the events, yet it was a real catastrophe. However, the media had its own purposes in this respect; one such purpose, according to researcher Stephan Kropelin, was to distract public opinion from the catastrophe of

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the Iraqi war, particularly, after the exposure of the torture scandal in Abu Ghraib prison in September 2004. “Ever since, western media coverage of the events in Darfur had been characterized by exaggeration and biased accusations, instead of coverage in which the parties are objectively described and the complicated causes and results of what was going on, on the human as well as the military levels, are revealed.”⁽⁷⁾

The world community, particularly the UN Security Council, condemned the Sudanese regime in a number of resolutions that ranged between concentrating on relief and human work and adopting UN resolution 1706 which called for intervention according to Chapter 2 of the UN Charter. It is a fact, however, that there are no less than 2.5 million Darfurs displaced and refugees in countries neighbouring Sudan as well as inside Sudan, that hundreds of villages were burned up, and that between 200 thousand and 400 thousand civilians were killed.

It all ended with UN resolutions calling for sending international forces to Darfur, a decision that led to an argument between the Sudanese government and the international community, as president Omar Hassan Al Bashir announced to a crowd of supporters that he rejects the existence of any single international soldier on Sudanese soil. However the SPLM and the Sudan Liberation Movement, which are partners in the ruling coalition led by Al Bashir’s National Congress Party, welcomed the international forces, which led to a split in the ruling alliance. Finally, the National Congress Party accepted the resolution after modifying the description of the international force to the Joint Forces, provided they are mostly African forces.

The UN resolution calling for sending international forces to Sudan became a center of debate in the Sudanese political arena for one whole year, during which a decision to take Sudanese officials involved in the Darfur crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, for allegedly committing crimes against humanity, was adopted. This made the Sudanese regime fight on more than one front. Moreover, the tense relations between Sudan and the international community had an impact that was overlooked by many analysts; concerting all efforts to refute the accusations and foil the condemnation resolutions, led to neglecting the implementation of the comprehensive peace treaty (Nivasha) with the leaders of the south. Two years and a half had passed without achieving much of what was agreed upon. Analysts believe that the south had been practically separated, as things remained as they ever had been and the southerners could not feel the benefits of what was called, the attractive unity, on which the north relied heavily to achieve the goals of the interim period proficiently. This did not happen, particularly, in the fields of development and democratic transformation, which makes it dubious that the southerners will vote for the unity of Sudan after the end

7. The Sudanese daily, *Al Rai Al Am*, June 24, 2007.

of the interim period in 2011, if things continue as they are now.

China, a new player in the international arena, emerged as a competitor to the United States in an oil rich area. Some external forces believe parties with conflicting interests aim to control large quantities of oil reserves through manipulating the disputes resulting from an increasing population with few resources, thereby weakening the central state. The tribal groups resorted to armed struggle against the central state, a step that was not common during the cold war era, when some countries used to resort to the Soviet Union to get armed and backed. Things have changed now; the Sudanese regime, which found itself confronting these conflicts as well as the isolation imposed by the United States, looked eastward towards China, Malaysia and India. It succeeded in establishing economic relations with these countries, particularly China which has the power to veto UN Security Council resolutions, oppose the wording of the draft resolutions before they are passed and impose its own modifications that limit the resolutions' strong forms of condemnation. Recently, some of those who opposed the role of China in the Darfur crisis started pressuring it by calling for a boycott of the Olympic Games, due to be hosted by China in 2008. The United States increased its pressure on China under the pretext that it (China) cannot be a permanent ally with countries that violate human rights. It was under such pressure that China started to play the role of a mediator, advisor and, sometimes, facilitator for Sudan; a role played also by Russia on whose opposition Sudan relied heavily. Yet Russia, who will take part in the international joint forces, was less committed than China.

It was expected that competition in Darfur would be stronger between America and France, as Darfur is adjacent to the conventional French sphere of influence. On the contrary, the two countries collaborated with each other, and now they have compatible stands. The Sudanese president accused his French counterpart Nicholas Sarkozy of adopting an American policy; France answered with convening an international conference on Darfur on 25 June 2007, whose resolutions gave momentum to the efforts aimed at solving the problem according to the UN Security Council resolutions passed earlier by the United States and Britain. Moreover, Sudan lost the ability to maneuver or to manipulate the discrepancies in the stands of the European states, which are now heading towards a strict unified stance based on the belief that time is running out and the tragedy in Darfur is still going on.

Sudan confides in the sympathy shown by the majority of the African countries and the African Union, yet most of the influential African countries, such as South Africa and Nigeria, take an adamant stand in this regard; they view the crisis as a conflict between Arabs and Africans, which makes them back the international resolutions against Sudan. Nevertheless, Sudan insists on the solution of the African forces, in the hope that some of these countries side with Sudan, or at least take a lenient stand.

THE ARAB ROLE IN THE DARFUR CRISIS

Despite the fact that they have tremendous impact on any potential Arab order, Arab peripheral countries, like Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania and the Comoro Islands, are conspicuously neglected by the Arab Strategy. Sudan, for instance, has an important strategic geographical location; it is a bridge or a passage between upper Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa, which makes it capable of giving a good example of religious coexistence, particularly between Moslems and Christians, in Africa. Sudan has a long coast on the Red Sea, which is a part of the African horn area, and its influence extends from Chad to Niger and West Africa; an influence quite apparent in the Sudanese songs and music reaching that far. In the seventies the Arabs raised the slogan “Sudan is the food basket of the Arab world,” a reference to an important economic aspect of Sudan.

Such negligence of the conflict could be attributed to the comprehensive Arab crisis, as manifested in the state of weakness, dismantlement and bewilderment the Arab countries are living in. Yet there is another important reason that has an intellectual dimension and has something to do with the vision of the Arabs, vis-a-vis the other; it is noticeable in this respect that many Arab countries and many politicians and intellectuals do not accept the idea of a pluralistic, multicultural country. This, perhaps, explains why there is no real sympathy for the issues of the Christians, Blacks, the Kurds and the Berbers, not only inside their own countries, but also in the other Arab countries. There were no serious attempts to understand these issues. This is a remnant of what was known, in Arab history, as “Shuubiya”, which was transformed into an obsession that settled deep in the Arab mind and made it fear the other and regard him as a conspirator, a saboteur or anti-Arab. So far as Sudan is concerned, neither the Arab League nor any other Arab country ever attempted to solve the issue of the south with a view to helping Sudan reach an agreement or a final solution for this problem. On the contrary, some Arab countries were keen to supply the northern (Arab) governments with money and, sometimes with arms, in order to terminate, by military force, the conflict with the southerners, who are regarded as Christians and of African origin.

It was quite natural, then, that peace in the south was reached through African initiatives, particularly that of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which was backed by IGAD friends. Egypt was either excluded, or it voluntarily kept itself away from playing a role acceptable by all parties; the northern opposition, under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance, was active in Egypt, and John Garang was a frequent visitor to Cairo, an added value that was not well appreciated by Egypt. The same applies to Libya. Those who followed up the events of that period would notice that the two countries refused to deal with the issue of the south as long as the principle of the right of self-determination was raised. Both Egypt and Libya understood the right of self-determination as the right to separate, which made them keep away from involvement

in Sudanese affairs.

The Darfur crisis was further aggravated during a period of intentional Arab isolation, or rather when Sudanese affairs were intentionally ignored by the Arabs. Egypt and Libya, though the most influential, dealt carelessly with the issue, perhaps as a result of underestimating the seriousness of the crisis in the beginning, just like the Sudanese regime itself. That is why, perhaps, the Egyptian and Libyan involvement in the issue was so late that it came within the framework of the international solution; Egypt showed its readiness to take part in the joint forces and Libya is now trying to unify the Darfur organizations so as to sit at the table of negotiations to reach a new agreement, or else to modify the Abuja treaty. Libya is also working to improve neighborhood ties between Sudan and Chad, but it deprives Sudan of its right to have other mediators; that is why Libya was upset when Saudi Arabia hosted a reconciliation meeting between the Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir and his Chadian counterpart, Idris Debi, in Jeddah.

Silence and disregard was not a stand taken only by Arab countries represented in the Arab League, but also by the Arab peoples; the human tragedy of Darfur neither drew the attention of the Arab civil society organizations, nor that of the charity organizations. Contrastingly, members of the Doctors Without Borders organization were covering the whole region of Darfur, and members of the Save the Children organization were working actively in villages, together with hundreds of foreign organizations. When some Arab and Islamic organizations heard of the protests, the Muslim Scholars Association sent a delegation led by Dr. Mohammad Saleem Al Awwa, who, upon his return, took a biased stand in which he denied the fact that there were cases of rape. In an interview with an Egyptian weekly he said: "All parties have assured us that the word 'rape', used all over the world in the sense of sexual rape, is not used in this sense in Sudan. It is used there in the sense of using force. And when I asked some women about the sexual rape, they denied that men of their families and tribes could ever say something like that. Moreover, the international organizations which investigated this issue said that women were shy to talk about such a matter."⁽⁸⁾

It is worthwhile mentioning here that even the Sudanese authorities admitted the existence of some rape cases, but attributed them to lack of discipline and to the prevailing state of war. Dr. Ahmad Al Mufti, Director General of Khartoum International Centre for Human Rights says: "Yes, there are some violations that are admitted by the government itself as well as the international community, but how we can assess them and what is to be done about them is the focal point. After all, admitting the existence of such cases is something positive."⁽⁹⁾

8. Mohammad Saleem El Awwa, "The truth about what is going on in Sudan", *Akhbar al Adab Weekly*, September 19, 2004.

9. An interview published in the Sudanese daily *Alwan*, March 21, 2007.

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The official Arab stand was a virtual implementation of the famous Arab saying “support your brother, whether he was tyrannical or tyrannized” in its pre-Islamic meaning. The Arab League committee commissioned to examine the Sudanese file under the supervision of secretary-general Amr Musa, said it “supports Sudan in opposing the international attempts, particularly the Americans and the British, to urge the UN Security Council to issue a resolution calling for the deployment of international forces in Darfur. The meeting called for consolidating the African Union force deployed in the region.”⁽¹⁰⁾

The committee which comprises Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman, Libya, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, expressed its hope that the Arab countries execute the commitments made in the Arab Summit conference held in Sudan in March 2006, which stipulates financial aid to the African Unity Forces for six months.”⁽¹¹⁾

An Arab writer expressed his astonishment at the strange Arab attitude of opposing the deployment of a neutral UN peace keeping force under the pretext that such a step represents a threat for the sovereignty of Sudan. He writes: “What is so strange is that no Arab government has noticed any contradiction in this common stand; the regime in Khartoum, that rejects the deployment of peace keeping forces in western Sudan, welcomes the deployment of an international force of ten thousand troops in Southern Sudan. It even considers this step a main factor in keeping peace in the area as reached in a treaty the ink, in which it was written, has still to dry up. No one ever asks about the reason why sovereignty is a problem in the west, but not so in the south?”⁽¹²⁾

It is worthwhile mentioning here that Algeria, which represented the Arab group in the UN Security Council at the time, opposed the establishment of a UN fact finding committee to investigate whether acts of genocide were committed in Darfur. Abdullah Bali, who had been an Ambassador to the UN and a member of the Security Council for two years, kept on repeating, in the name of the Arab countries, the attitude of Sudan with regards to Darfur. He even wrote a letter to the Security Council in September 2004, saying that “the UN draft resolution Nr. 1556, which calls for disarming the Janjaweed militia, creates problems... in our view it does harm to the Sudanese government which made positive initiatives and acted in the right direction.”⁽¹³⁾

On October 2007 Libya hosted a round of negotiations in the city of Sirte, in an attempt to manipulate its good relations with the various Darfur factions, but the meeting was a big failure as some influential factions, such as the Justice and

10. The London based *Al Hayat Daily*, August 21, 2006.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Nadim Hasbani, “On the Arab Stand on the Darfur Issue,” *Al Hayat Daily*, March 20, 2007.

13. *Ibid.*

Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Mohammad Nour, boycotted the meeting and requested that it be held in South Africa; a proposal suggesting a proclaimed rejection to the Arab role, irrespective of the generous aid and assistance presented by Libya.

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Many attempts were made, and many agreements were reached to stop fighting, the last of which was that of Abuja on May 9, 2006, which stipulated principles that could be helpful in solving the problem. Yet some factions refused to sign the agreement, which transformed it into a bilateral agreement between the regime in Khartoum and the faction of Meni Arko in the Sudan Liberation Movement. Nevertheless, many observers considered the Darfur peace agreement a step forward that still needs more effort, to convince the other factions to join in. A comprehensive peace agreement could be reached in case the demands of the rejecting factions were included in a new agreement. These are:

1. Recognising Darfur as one region.
2. Compensating the victims of war.
3. Bringing the criminals who caused this catastrophe to court.
4. Giving Darfur the right to have a vice president.⁽¹⁴⁾

Some believe that when the Sudanese government signed the agreement, it aimed at splitting the factions, spoiling them and dividing them into loyalists and rejectionists, which is why some of these factions give priority to the Darfur dialogue. Article, 31 of Chapter 4, of the Darfur peace treaty states clearly that it is “a conference that enables all representatives of Darfur notables to meet for discussing the challenges of bringing back peace to the land of Darfur, putting an end to the splits among the local communities therein, and solving all current problems, with the objective of building a common future for all.”

Some Darfurs are afraid that Darfur is far beyond belonging to a unified Sudan; which is why they look for ways to regain confidence and mend the social fabric in Darfur through citizenship awareness. This requires solving the crisis of the center and peripheries and putting an end to the state of retreat that Darfur may live in, in the future.

It is a mistake to regard the deployment of the Joint Forces in Darfur as a

14. “State of the Country,” The Eighth Strategic Sudanese Repot. Khartoum, The Sudanese Studies Centre, 2007, p. 107.

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magic wand that would solve the Darfur crisis; we should look into the issue at three levels: security, human and political; with the political level as the basic one, seconded by the security, the military and the human solutions. This means the Darfur factions should be unified so that a comprehensive agreement like that signed in Nivasha with the Southerners, is reached. Yet, it is noticeable that the subject of negotiations with the factions was left for various uninfluential mediators such as Eretria, Libya, the UN special envoy, or the African Unity Organisation envoy. This should be a national or a Sudanese – Sudanese issue, yet the opposition parties remain gloatingly silent, as if they desire that the regime is left to sink in the Darfur quagmire.

In conclusion, Sudan is now at a real juncture. It is on the verge of partition, starting with the separation of the south. This outlook is neither pessimistic nor optimistic; everyday life proves that Sudan which has, since independence, failed to build up a unified, pluralistic, multicultural nation-state, is now at its worst. The south concentrates on its government and citizens, and hardly participates in what is regarded as a national affair; the government in Khartoum is weakened by the crises in Darfur and the east, and by the recent protests in Manaseer and the Kajbar dam in the north. Despite oil production, there is a lack of cash flow, and a failure to improve the standard of living for the people of Sudan. Sudan is in need of wise men who can decide its future and define the road that should be taken; the road to unity or to dismantlement. ■

4

Will Democratic Strains in Evangelicalism and Islam Allow Secularism to Survive?*

Walter Russell Mead**

The question before us is, “Are the democratic strains in Evangelicalism and Islam strong enough to allow secularism to survive?” Islam and Evangelical Protestantism are two religions that think they have very little in common, but in fact they have a great deal in common. Now before addressing this question I will discuss the background of Evangelicalism and its similarities with Islam.

Mainstream Islam and Evangelicalism have no clerical hierarchy. The clergy are not considered, as in Catholicism, as people with a special office. In Islam clergy are religious scholars, who are approved by other scholars. Yet they are not ordained in the way that priests are ordained. If you compare some actions that occurred in Christian history with what Wahhabi Islam has done in recent years or even centuries you will find similarities. For example, out of a belief that the popular approach of praying for help to the saints or asking for intercession with God is unorthodox; saints’ tombs have been destroyed. In addition decoration that is seen as detracting from pure worship of God has been destroyed. In the United Kingdom you can see in medieval cathedral after cathedral where the soldiers of Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century destroyed, for example the shrine of St. Thomas Beckett at Canterbury Cathedral, because they believed that this popular pilgrimage site detracted from the direct worship of God. The soldiers wanted to emphasize that there is no mediator between man and God through the church.

Like Evangelicals today many Wahhabis and others in Islam believe that we should go directly to the holy book and disregard centuries of theology and study. The Evangelicals and the Wahhabis would say that the plain book of God is the place where we have to look. Therefore, they are very selective in the traditional religious scholarship that they embrace. Generally Evangelical Christians have a view of the Greek and Hebrew scriptures that is very similar to the view that many conservative Muslims hold of the Holy Koran. They believe that every word in it is inspired and binding. They believe that the Holy Bible is completely different from other books in that was verbally inspired by God. There is no false statement in it. Furthermore a plain man can understand what it teaches.

American Evangelicalism has its theological and cultural roots in the United Kingdom. Today it is much stronger in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Tony Blair is probably the most committed Christian to be in 10 Downing

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Street since William Gladstone left office, but he is not an Evangelical. However, what is the essence of this religious movement that has been so influential in both cultures? Here again it is somewhat like Islam in its extreme individualism. For many people in the world your religion is a part of your family and cultural identity. So one is Greek Orthodox because your family has always been Greek Orthodox. In fact on a Greek passport, if you are a citizen of Greece it marks your religion as Greek Orthodox. American Evangelicalism has the idea that an individual is not an Evangelical unless they make a personal decision to become one. A child cannot make that decision. Evangelicals do not believe, as do many Christian groups in baptizing babies. One has to have reached a certain age of reason, 13 to 15 or older before you can become one, and many people do not.

Evangelicals today in the United States are about 26% of the population. They have grown from about 23% to 26% in recent years. They have more political influence than before because 52% of Americans are Protestant. Evangelicals are one of the types of Protestant denominations in the US and they have gone from being the minority of the Protestants to being the majority of the Protestants. It is not a big majority but they do have more influence. Evangelicals used to be more poor and marginalized in society. Increasingly they have more money and education so they are playing a larger role, but they are not going to take over. A quarter of Americans are Roman Catholic; and they are not about to become Evangelical. Another roughly quarter of Americans are mainstream Protestant; very few of them will become Evangelical. If you look at American society generally many people choose a religion different from their parents religion, or at least a different variety of their religion. There is a lot of theological ferment, which results in religion becoming more individualistic. This basic tradition of religious pluralism is not going to change in the US, certainly not in my lifetime.

Now if you look at world history many religions have been culturally stabilizing forces. They prescribed a set of roles and ideas rooted in tradition that ought to be the normative guides for a community. Some Jewish sects wear clothes that were popular in the 18th Century when a certain religious style crystallized. They follow a prescribed way to live, to prepare their food and so on. American Evangelicalism or Anglo-American Evangelicalism has always been rather open to change and even to change in religious ideas. Their normative pattern found in their theological literature and in their preaching is their understanding of the theology of God's call to the prophet Abraham as told in the Hebrew Scriptures. Where God calls Abraham, he says, "Leave your father and your father's house, and come with me to a new land where I will bless you." So this introduces the idea that that you find God in the future. So the Anglo-Americans who left the Catholic church for the Protestant faith, the British who left the UK to come live in the US, and the Americans who left the East Coast to move into the frontiers all left the world of tradition in order to embrace the new and the different. There is a sense that they have from their religion that they are not abandoning their religion or their traditions. This has been and remains far beyond people who are theologi-

cally Evangelical a very central cultural element in the life of the Anglo-American world. It has a lot to do with the way these societies have been so quick to adopt capitalism and so ready to allow its disruptive forces to work through their societies. That has had rather large consequences for the global distribution of power and wealth and many other things. This may be the chief engine through which this religious tradition is changing and modifying world conditions even today.

So there are many similarities large and small. In the ceremony that commemorated the tenth anniversary of the death of Princess Diana every woman at that church service was wearing a hat, that is to say, the Christian *hijab*. In Christianity this comes from St. Paul, in one of his epistles he writes, "Let women keep their hair covered in church". So, to this day, in many Evangelical churches where they treat these letters as literally inspired commands of God women by custom will wear hats in church. However the Christian *hijab* is only needed in church, it is not needed in other places.

Another similarity that I find striking is between the two words *jihad* and *crusade*. In the popular language of both Muslims and Evangelical Christians these words have essentially the same meaning. That is to say when an Evangelical Christian talks about a *crusade* they are not talking about putting on armor and getting on a horse and riding to conquer territory for Christ. They are talking about a moral struggle against a social evil. So they would speak about a *crusade* against pornography. A *crusade* against prostitution, a *crusade* against birth defects. To them it is the most natural term in the world and they cannot understand why anyone would be upset by it. Now obviously when Evangelicals hear a Muslim using the word *jihad* although the two words are pretty much identical in their current theological usage, they become upset and imagine that this means everyone is getting a sword and is ready to come attack someone else. Obviously Muslims often have exactly the same reaction when they hear Christians speak of the word *crusade*. We are I think two communities that are divided by our similarities, as much as by our differences.

Winston Churchill spoke of the Americans and the British as being two people divided by a common tongue. There are some very interesting ways in which Evangelicals and Muslims actually are in agreement about many things and then that sharpens the importance of the disagreements that remain. I do not intend to underestimate the disagreements or play them down. They are quite real. However, I think often our misunderstanding of the similarities makes it difficult for us to actually understand how Evangelicals are like Muslims and how Muslims are like them. So that is a general remark about Evangelicals and Muslims.

SECULARISM

Secularism is one of those commonly used words whose specific meaning is difficult to identify. As I understand it at least in western experience today and I maybe also incorporating experience in the Islamic world, there are three types of

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secularism that currently exist in the world.

WESTPHALIAN SECULARISM

The first kind we can call Westphalian secularism. That is in 1648 at the Treaty of Westphalia the Catholic and Protestant rulers of Europe came to the reluctant understanding that neither was going to be able to destroy the other. That for the foreseeable future you were going to have to be able to have international relations between Catholic and Protestant states who disagreed profoundly over religion but nevertheless needed a framework and a forum for addressing their disputes and resolving their problems. That Westphalian system of state relations later expanded to include Muslims when the Ottoman Empire entered fully into the European State and diplomatic system. Catholics, Protestants and Muslims were all a part of an international system that fully conformed to the religious dictates of no particular group. Yet this system provided a framework in which people from different religious backgrounds and states, rooted in different religious cultures discussed the issues among them. Now that form of secularism has been challenged and is being challenged today. Still, I think that it is likely to survive.

The communists tried to revolutionize the international state system and in a sense tried in the beginning to revolutionize the entire world, but were ultimately forced to accept that parts of the world were going to continue to be non-communist for the foreseeable future. Therefore communist and bourgeois states, religious states, secular states and so on still had to meet. Today some Islamists speak of wanting to restore or create an era in which the world will accept Islamic concepts of International Law and Agreements. That again is unlikely for the foreseeable future. One expects that even though there will be resistance from individual states and so on, we are going to have Westphalian secularism at the international level as far as the eye can see. But there are two other traditions of secularism in the world today. These have to do with secularism within states, and in cultures. How do we think about the future of those traditions? Particularly given from both Evangelical Christians and from some Muslims that there is hesitation and debate about the value of these secular traditions.

JACOBEAN SECULARISM

The two other forms of secularism that are found today have two roots. One in the French Revolution, this is a Jacobean secularism, and one in the Anglo-American tradition which can be symbolized by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in the United Kingdom. The secularism of 1688 and the secularism of 1789 have quite important differences. The secularism of 1789, Jacobean secularism is far more influential on a global level than the Anglo-American tradition. What the French revolutionaries found themselves confronting, was that religion, in France was essentially one power, the Catholic Church. There were smaller religious mi-

norities in France but they were not significant at a political level. So the question was, a state with a modernizing agenda like the Jacobean state had to control the church or limit the power of the church. It did so by saying key political and developmental decisions in France will be made on the basis of rational utility rather than on the basis of religious belief. They saw the church as a power that had to be contained in order for the secular modernizing project to advance. As we look through the world we see a long history of other states adopting this model.

Up to a certain extent the model was replicated in; the Italian Risorgimento, the reunification of Italy; Bismarck's Kulturkampf, where he took on the Catholic Church; and the Brazilian Revolution, where a progressive Brazilian Army overthrew the Empire in order to establish a more secular Republic. After the Mexican Revolution of 1910 clergy in Mexico, until very recently, were forbidden to wear clerical garb off church property and religious processions were limited. Attaturk's secularism in Turkey absolutely and conscientiously was framed on the Jacobean example. Attaturk's own literary language was French and this heavily influenced his notions of modernity. Even Egyptian secularism before Nasser was rooted in a conscious attempt to adopt the French model. The Bolsheviks, while in many ways quite different from the Jacobeans, nevertheless adopted this key concept against Russian orthodoxy. They believed that the modernizing agenda of the state was only possible if one drastically limited the power of the clergy. Jinnah in Pakistan had some of this thinking as well, though he died too soon for it to really emerge in terms of the politics of the state. However up to this last generation the Pakistani Army was very much shaped by Jinnah's thinking. In India, Nehru had a concept of a secular India that would be neither Hindu nor Muslim but modernist. The Baathist movements in Iraq and Syria shared this view. Nasser and his version of Arab Socialism also shared in this tradition. So it seems that when people in the contemporary Islamic world speak about secularism. The concept of secularism referred to is precisely this French Jacobean model.

From this perspective, the question of whether secularism can survive is really a question of, "Can the state maintain its ability to limit the influence of religion in the public sphere? Or will a popular upsurge of religious piety led by politically active clerics succeed in re-imposing a specifically religious agenda, and in a sense move the project of modernization from the secular 'rational perspective' into one that is founded in the doctrines and beliefs of religion?" It is an interesting question and I think history will give us different answers in different places. A case in point is Turkey. Turkey is a country that in the Islamic world almost defined the success of Jacobean secularism as applied to Islam. Now what you are seeing is exactly the return of a more religious sensibility, which is very interesting if you consider Turkish Islam. Turkish Islam is extremely pluralistic with among others strong Sufi elements. Therefore it might well be that Turkey is an excellent laboratory to see if a country whose secularism had been cast in a Jacobean model can in fact find some new path forward.

Essential parts of this new path are education and democracy. In democracy, a

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major component is accountability, where citizens vote according to performance. However in some countries politics are based on sectarian ideologies. This may be detrimental to the accountability principle of democracy, because people do not vote according to performance, but they vote according to sectarian allegiance. This question of, “Do voters judge politicians by result or do they just continue to vote for the same politicians because they represent a certain ethnicity or sectarian nature?” is not so much a question about religions as it is about the cultural and educational levels of voters. One finds that as literacy improves voters tend to have a basis other than traditional loyalties for voting. Also in the experience of democracy, voters have to try something and then see if it works or it doesn't work. For example, in the United States, Bush got an extremely high percentage of the votes of Evangelical Christians in 2004. Obviously he is not eligible to run again. My guess is that, if he ran again, his percentage would be less in 2008 than in 2004. It would not go away but it would be less.

One must understand that when voters go to vote they have a mix of motives. Some of them are identity based. Some voters vote for a group member because they know that is the way to obtain government money. That is not an irrational reason for somebody to vote. Another reason somebody might vote is, I see that you are a very religious person and I believe that people who are religious, who pray regularly and go to the mosque regularly will make honest decisions and also will understand me and my family. So I am voting for you for that reason.

Now the question is then if the person does not live up to that, do the voters pay attention? The answer is going to be different in different places. Yet this is where the state needs to persevere with the task of basic education. With universal suffrage the country is going to be governed by the average level of education, not by the sentiments of the educated elite, but by the average people. If the average people have only three years of primary school, you are going to get what you paid for. Democracy must have education or it will not long survive.

ANGLO-AMERICAN SECULARISM

It is important now to also look at the Anglo-American model of secularism. This model has not been as widely adopted but it does give a different answer to some of these questions. It is not for me to say whether this model can be useful or can provide an interesting point of reference for discussion in Islamic countries.

Voltaire after having spent sometime in Britain in the middle early eighteenth century wrote a letter back to some friends in France where he was describing the remarkable situation that there were many different religious sects but no religious war. Voltaire, in his characteristically brilliant way put this into an epigram: If you have one religion you have despotism; if you have two religions you have civil war; if you have 30 religions they will all live together happily and at peace. What Voltaire saw at that time was that there were so many different Christian sects in the United Kingdom that not one of them could reasonably hope to push

out the others. Even the strongest, the Church of England, which was then and still remains today the established church of the country, had given up the effort to stamp out other forms of Protestantism and even the Catholic faith. Now at this time these different sects had absolutely no real sympathy for each other. The Anglicans thought that the Catholics were fundamentally wrong about religion and would go to hell because of what they believed. The Anabaptists, or as they are now known, Baptists, believed that Anglicans and Catholics both were going to hell because they did not have a true faith. The Presbyterians thought the same about the others. All of these different sects believed they were the one true religion and the others were false. So at a theological level you had complete polarization. At the level of politics there was a realization that just because you think that the Baptists are wrong doesn't mean that they are going to go away. Meanwhile we still have to agree how to pay for a necessary new road in the town. The British did not reach this position easily.

The Seventeenth Century in British history was a period of religious warfare and instability. It only ended at about the time of the Glorious Revolution when James the II who had then tried to re-impose Catholicism on Britain was overthrown by a coalition of different Protestant forces. And from that time on the English and then later the Americans had a religious system again that was based on this combination, on the one hand religious sects that make odd theological claims, on the other hand a political reality in which these theological claims could not be translated into state power. The concept of the religiously neutral state as it developed in the United States was not based on the idea that a religiously neutral state was a positive development. That was actually not the view. It was based on the idea that there could be no agreement among the different religions over which religion the state should favor. Therefore they all agreed that at least with the neutral state my enemies could not get what they wanted.

This specific point of view presented itself in the discussions over the U.S. Constitution when the first amendment was adopted. The first amendment prohibited the establishment of a national religion by the federal government. At the time the New England states all had established religions; Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire were Congregationalist and Calvinist while Rhode Island was neither. In Pennsylvania the Quakers were the strongest of the religious sects. Law in Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina established Anglicanism as the official religion. However none of these states would agree that the federal government should favor the other religion. The result of this was that the federal government had no established religion, therefore, preachers had to be entrepreneurial.

Historically people had looked to the government to support religion. It was the government's duty to build a church, to train the clergy, to provide salaries for the clergy. This meant your wealth and success as a clergyman or your success was not based on how much money the people gave you to contribute to your activities. "Success" was based on your salary from the government, as it still is

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today in the United Kingdom, Germany and other European countries where clergy are paid like civil servants. Clergy in the United States deprived of this state subsidy had to attract people into their religious services and develop methods of preaching and of worship that would bring in the crowds, bring in as they say the sheep. With the sheep comes the fleece for the clergy to live on. That is one of the reasons that American religion remains so dynamic and why in each generation it almost seems to re-invent itself and to reach out to the next generation.

Now we are seeing what you might call the Americanization of religion around the world today as religious movements and clerical leaders in other religious traditions and in other cultural traditions are adopting these techniques. Televangelists, very popular religious leaders, who the council of scholars do not think are great scholars but who are riveting preachers can bring in the crowds and set up organizations based on the money that people are willing to give them. This creates competition between religious leaders for dominance. So to come back to our question then, “Are the democratic tendencies in Islam and in Evangelicalism strong enough to enable secularism to survive?”

In the Anglo-American system secularism is partially the product of competition among historically undemocratic -even anti-democratic religious forces. This suggests to me that one possible future for a form of this kind of secularism in the Islamic world would rest on the pluralism that exists within Islam. You know the question is not so much democratic ideological commitment as it might be pluralism within the Islamic tradition. That is to say yes, there is Wahhabism, there are also many forms of Sufism. There are different schools, different approaches. Is it possible that the pluralism within Islam, and there is a great deal of it, can develop and push a public consensus toward the idea that the government should not endorse a particular religious leader or a particular interpretation but should leave room for many different interpretations? A tolerance for pluralism has actually been closer to the historic norm in the Islamic world. Also significant is the idea that the state is not anti-religious, with the result that the state will not find itself in conflict with the religious feelings of a large numbers of its citizens.

I will just close by observing that the difference between modernity and secularism on the one hand and religion and tradition on the other tends to be stronger in societies that have a French secularism than in societies that have an Anglo-American form of secularism. It may be possible or even helpful to see if there are ways to graft these models together. The result being that the secularism that there may be within Islamic society is more properly seen as a form of religious pluralism, which is tolerant. ■

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt,
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007

Reviewed by **William B. Quandt***

Early in 2006, the London Review of Books published an article by two well-known American academics on the role of the powerful pro-Israel lobby. Originally the article had been intended for an American monthly publication, but it was turned down by the editors, presumably because it was too controversial. And controversy did indeed follow the publication of the article – letters to the editors, harsh denunciations, accusations of anti-Semitism, and vigorous replies by the authors, Professors John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Stephen Walt (Harvard). Now the same authors have published a book-length version of their thesis that takes into account many of the criticisms directed against the article and responds pointedly to them. Once again, there has been controversy as well as praise for the result. (I suspect that many of the critics have not bothered to read the rather long and dense book, with its 106 pages of footnotes).

To understand how the authors decided to tackle this sensitive issue, it is important to note that they do not start from a background in Middle East studies. As far as I can detect, they have no special affection or animus for either Israel or the Arab side of the region's long-running conflict. Instead, they are scholars who study international relations from the perspective of the academic school referred to as "realism".

The tenets of that school are important to understand. Realists start with the understanding that each state in the international system must worry about its security. There is no overarching mechanism to guarantee a state against attack, so each must look after itself. Self preservation is the simple rule of the game in what is believed to be an anarchic, or potentially anarchic, international system.

States that hope to survive and prosper in such a system must be hard-headed (realistic) about their national interests. They must be attentive to shifts in the balance of power around them. They must calculate costs and benefits. They will sometimes have to ally with "enemies of my enemies", even when that means cooperating with an objectively abhorrent regime.

Realists tend to believe that these imperatives are so important that one can predict state behavior without looking too closely at the role of individual leaders, their ideologies and personalities, and the domestic political pressures that they face. Instead, to understand foreign policy you must look at the systemic power realities that confront any given state. That will lead you to an understanding of what each such state must do to survive and prosper.

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The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

Why, given this outlook, would Walt and Mearsheimer break a cardinal rule of realism and examine an aspect of the domestic politics of a major power? I believe that the answer is that they see a major disconnect between American national interests, especially in the post Cold War period, and the actual conduct of American foreign policy, which seems to be inexplicable by the normal rules of rational calculation. (It should be noted that the authors, along with many other “realists” opposed the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003). In particular, they believe that American policy has sided far too much with Israel – providing a large amount of unconditional assistance – and often subordinating American interests to those of Israel. By doing so, they argue, the United States has jeopardized its own interests, has fostered anti-American sentiment in much of the Arab and Islamic world, has found it more difficult to find willing allies to join in the fight against extremism and terrorism, and has mistakenly engaged in a war in Iraq that has proved to be an enormous mistake. In perhaps their most audacious claim in the book, they argue (p. 17) that the pro-Israel lobby was “the principal driving force behind the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003”. There were, of course, other factors, but the role of the lobby, they maintain, was a necessary, although not sufficient, factor in producing that result.

Many readers in the Middle East may be inclined to respond to all of this by saying: “What’s new about this? We’ve been saying much the same thing for decades”. Indeed, many Americans who have had experience in government dealing with Arab-Israeli issues will say much the same thing. What is new is that the United States is now engaged in an extremely unpopular and extremely expensive war, and that Al-Qaida terrorists attacked America on 9/11, and that anti-Americanism is at all-time high levels in many parts of the world. Many people want answers as to why all of this happened. Walt and Mearsheimer are providing at least part of the answer – the Israel lobby.

The structure of the book shows their determination to build as strong a case as they can. First, they show that the levels of aid given to Israel are much higher than can be justified by any objective measure. (Even critics do not contest this point). Second, they show that US support for Israel cannot convincingly be explained by alternative factors such as shared strategic interests (at least since the end of the Cold war) or moral factors (since Israel’s behavior in the Palestinian occupied territories is hardly consistent with liberal or democratic norms). It is worth noting that the authors do say they support Israel’s right to exist within the 1967 borders, and that the United States should uphold that right, but that Israel’s occupation and its policies in Lebanon and toward Syria and Iran are not policies that serve American interests and should not be supported.

They spend some time defining the lobby, noting the major groups that make it up, acknowledging that not all American Jews are part of it, and emphasizing

the relatively recent role of American Christian fundamentalists as part of the lobby. Some may feel that they do not spend enough time showing how the lobby manages to get its way (especially with Congress) and that they do not manage to prove conclusively their major claim that the lobby was a principal driving force leading the Bush administration to war in Iraq. On this latter point, I have little doubt that some individuals associated with pro-Israel groups did push hard for the war, but I am not convinced that President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld saw the Iraq war as primarily a gift to Israel or the lobby. They had their own reasons that involved demonstrating American power in the aftermath of 9/11. Some of them (especially Cheney) genuinely seemed to be obsessed with the idea that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and that he might somehow make these available to future terrorist groups. Of course, this now seems far-fetched, but so is the idea that the United States went to war more for the sake of Israel than for the sake of some notion of protecting American interests from future threats.

From my own experience in government in the 1970s, when the lobby was already a potent force, and from my study of how American foreign policy in the Middle East is made, I would say that Mearsheimer and Walt have made their case effectively for the uniquely powerful role of the pro-Israel lobby, but that a full picture requires a bit more nuance. First, the lobby is most powerful when issues of policy are decided in Congress. That explains levels of aid, arms deals, and the knee-jerk willingness of majorities in the House and Senate to sign letters and vote for resolutions that are solidly pro-Israel.

The other role of the lobby, broadly defined, particularly since about the mid-1980s, has been to influence the discourse on Middle East issues in official Washington. The key here was the emergence of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), which was well funded and well run, and quickly made its mark in Washington. Before long, other think tanks were also parroting a similar line. Some of the earliest calls for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein came from groups like the Project for the New American Century which had a very pro-Israel stance. Today the drums for war against Iran beat loudly at the American Enterprise Institute, where pro-Israel sentiment also abounds. There are, of course, other voices in Washington, but one should not underestimate the effectiveness of places like WINEP and their periodic Presidential Study Groups in laying out the main lines of accepted orthodoxy for the politically ambitious. And in significant numbers since the 1980s, it has been individuals from these think tanks who have moved into key policy advisory roles in the Reagan, Bush I, Clinton and Bush II administrations.

Another point that I would emphasize is that one needs to make a distinction

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between the direct role of the Israeli government and the role of the lobby. Already in the Nixon administration the Israeli government had privileged access to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. If Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin wanted to reach Kissinger, he had a special phone number to call that would get him immediate access. Only the Soviet Ambassador was treated similarly. Kissinger and Rabin both disliked the lobby, and part of their understanding was that Rabin would keep the lobby from pressuring Nixon and Kissinger and in return Kissinger would remain in very close contact with the embassy; it worked. The lobby had very little direct access to the White House, but the Israelis themselves did.

I personally witnessed a remarkable use by the Israeli government of the power of the lobby in October 1977, just after President Carter had agreed with the Soviets on a joint call for reconvening the Geneva Conference. The Israelis and their supporters were angry, and within days there was a firestorm of protest against Carter's policy. Carter then met with Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan in New York, who began the discussion by noting that Carter was having domestic problems with the friends of Israel because of the joint US-USSR communiqué. In a remarkably blunt manner, he offered to help Carter with "his problem", but the price would be a new US-Israeli joint communiqué that would reaffirm various American commitments to Israel. Carter was hesitant, left for dinner, but instructed his Secretary of State to discuss options with Dayan. When Carter returned after dinner, he asked Secretary Vance what he had come up with. Vance said there was no meeting of the minds. Dayan wanted a new joint statement; Vance was opposed, preferring that each party state its own position. Dayan intervened to say that the second option would not be good enough and that he would be unable to keep the pro-Israeli crowd from protesting if this was all we could do. Carter, the least political of presidents, paused and said: "Let's talk politics". He then told Vance to work on a joint US-Israeli statement. Dayan then promised to call off the lobby. It was all quite remarkable to witness.

A final and important point, is that the lobby is sometimes powerful by default. That is to say, presidents often conclude that it is not worth making a stand that will cost them politically. Yet when they do, as Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Bush I all did on occasions, they were often able to win out over the lobby. One of the better empirical studies of the results of contests between the president and the lobby, such as Reagan's decision to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1981, shows that a determined president can usually win, although often at some price. A president who is able to explain his policy in terms of American national security will even manage to get a timorous Congress to support him most of the time. But how many battles does a president want to fight?

Bush I decided to stand up to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the lobby

over the issue of settlements in 1991-92. And by doing so he helped Rabin to win the 1992 election in Israel. One might think that Bush I would be seen by many as having made an important contribution to Middle East peace by taking this stand. But in the 1992 election, he was roundly criticized by Bill Clinton for having pressured Israel too much. Clinton seemed determined as President never to run the risk that Bush I took. Nor has Bush II, who may well have concluded that his father lost the 1992 election because of the way in which he alienated pro-Israel (including many Evangelical Christian) voters. It will be interesting to see if Hillary Clinton in her quest for the presidency is willing to stand by the Clinton Proposals of 2000, which called, among other things, for the Palestinians to have sovereignty over most of east Jerusalem. My guess is that her desire to get elected will keep her from speaking out on these issues.

No book on this sensitive topic is going to satisfy all readers, but the authors have opened the way for a vigorous debate that Americans need to have. As we come out of the Bush II “moment” and try to project what a sensible American policy for the Middle East will be in the years ahead, it will be important for American politicians to defend their actions in terms of what is good for their country. This will not, in most likelihood, lead to the kind of sharp criticism of Israel found in this book, but it may bring back into focus the need for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace and the importance of the US role in achieving that. It may make future policy makers more attentive to the need for fundamental reassessments of US interests in the Middle East region. Bush II and his top advisers were not just misled by the lobby. They really did not believe, from the president on down, that Arab-Israeli peace was either achievable or particularly important. Nor did they realize the total lack of realism behind their transformative view of the Middle East. (Many Israelis were actually more realistic than their American neo-conservative supporters. They after all had seen how difficult it was to transform Lebanon and to manage the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.) If the net effect of this book is to return Americans to a serious deliberation about the nature of the Middle East, the American interests at stake, and the most realistic way to advance those interests, it will have served a very important purpose. ■